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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea-expression doctrine has become an axiom of
copyright law.1 The doctrine ensures that the property rights
created by the copyright and patent laws are well defined.2 It
maintains the division between private right and public domain.3
By drawing a line between what can and cannot be protected by a
copyright, it provides comfort and certainty to those who draw on
the ideas of others.4 The doctrine is central to the constitutional
mandate of promoting the useful arts and sciences because it
maintains the vital division between the patent and copyright laws
that facilitates subject matter based regulation in patents and
subject matter independent regulation in copyrights.5 Such a
division safeguards the delicate balance between the First
Amendment and the incentive based intellectual property laws.6
Yet, when Congress acts pursuant to its Commerce,7 Treaty,8
or Taxing and Spending powers,9 rather than the power granted to
it under the Intellectual Property Clause,10 does this fundamental
doctrine of copyright law nevertheless apply? The answer to this
question depends on two seemingly intractable questions: First,
whether congressional grants of power qualify one another, and

1

See infra note 110.
See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text.
3
See infra note 215.
4
See infra Part III.A.
5
See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text.
6
Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“Because this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one
hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended
repeatedly.”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (“[The ideaexpression doctrine] strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
copyright law by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.” (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985))).
7
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
8
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9
Id. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
10
Id. at cl. 8.
2
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second, whether the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional
requirement. If the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional
doctrine, and if an exercise of congressional power under an
alternate grant would circumvent the doctrine’s constraints, then
the two provisions would be in conflict, requiring one
constitutional provision to yield to the other.
This Note will argue that the idea-expression doctrine is a
constitutional requirement embedded in the Intellectual Property
Clause’s distinction between the useful arts and sciences. This
Note will further argue for the application of a new test that
balances the purposes of the qualifying doctrine against the
purpose of the constitutional provision being qualified.
Part II of this Note will discuss the constitutional grants of
power that can be used to promulgate copyright-like legislation
and the tension inherent in using an alternate grant of constitutional
power to circumvent the requirements of the Intellectual Property
Clause. Part III of this Note will survey the facets of the ideaexpression doctrine and its corollaries to illustrate the doctrine’s
underlying purposes. Part IV will argue that the idea-expression
dichotomy finds its constitutional source in the distinction between
the useful arts and sciences. By mentioning both kinds of works,
the Constitution may have contemplated a division between a
regime of protection that provides monopolies for ideas after
careful examination of subject matter, and a regime that protects
only expression regardless of the subject matter.
Conflicts between constitutional grants of power have been
resolved in two traditional ways. First, the more subject-matter
specific grant of power must qualify the more general one.11 The
second possible way to resolve the conflict is to allow
congressional action to the extent of the broadest constitutional
grant of power.12 This would make the Commerce Clause the final
arbiter of congressional power. This Note will instead propose a
new canon of constitutional construction to resolve conflicts
between horizontal constitutional provisions. Part V introduces the
Horizontal Subordination test, a balancing test that determines
11
12

See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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whether one constitutional provision should qualify another.
Applying this test will ensure that the delicate balance of
enumerated and limited federal powers persists amidst overlapping
constitutional grants of congressional power.
II. USING ALTERNATE CONGRESSIONAL POWERS TO PROTECT
EXPRESSIVE WORKS
The copyright and patent laws find their constitutional support
in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to protect writings and inventions for
limited times. Yet, many such works could also be regulated under
other constitutional grants of power.
For example, many
copyrighted works travel through or substantially affect interstate
commerce,13 bringing their protection within the purview of the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution.14 This section
will discuss the various alternate sources of constitutional power
that can be used to protect intellectual property rights that are
similar to those conferred under the copyright and patent laws.
This section will discuss the Commerce Clause, the Treaty
Power, and the Taxing and Spending Power as alternate means of
protecting intellectual property rights. This section will also
describe the problems inherent in employing an alternate
congressional power to accomplish legislative goals that would
typically be subject to the constraints of the Intellectual Property
Clause. Among the problems that arise are difficulties in
delineating the metes and bounds of the intellectual property right
being conferred and in maintaining the current division between
patent and copyright law.
13

A recording artist’s success, for example, is generally measured by national, and
even international, sales. See, e.g., Robert Palmer, The Year’s Best: 1984 In Review; Pop
Music Made A Comeback And Video Helped It Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1984, § 2, at 19
(describing artists’ success in terms of national album sales). With the advent of music
videos, music is very much a business dependent on interstate sales. Id.
14
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Generally
speaking, performing artists who attract bootleggers are those who are sufficiently
popular that their appeal crosses state or national lines.”).
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A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.15 Although
the current interpretation of the Commerce Clause supports
legislation that meets the test articulated in United States v.
Lopez,16 the Commerce Clause had not always been so expansively
interpreted.17
One of the earliest attempts to regulate intellectual property
rights under the Commerce Clause failed because of a narrow
interpretation of the clause. The Supreme Court decided the
validity of a federal intellectual property statute in The Trademark
Cases.18 The statute in that case imposed criminal sanctions for
violating trademark rights.19 After finding that the power to pass
15
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“[T]he proper test requires an
analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of
home-grown wheat).
16
United States v. Lopez required, among other things, legislative findings, a
jurisdictional element, and a logical nexus between the economic activity and interstate
commerce. See 514 U.S. at 560–64.
17
See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 306 (1851) (finding that state regulation that affected intrastate activity was not a
regulation of interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824)
(“The power of regulating commerce extends to the regulation of navigation. The power
to regulate commerce extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations, and among the several States. It does not stop at the
external boundary of a State. But it does not extend to a commerce which is completely
internal.”) (emphasis omitted).
18
100 U.S. 82 (1879).
19
Act of August 14, 1876, ch. 274, §§ 4–5, 19 Stat. 141, 141–42. The statute stated the
following:
Section 4. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person
or persons, knowingly and willfully cast, engrave, or manufacture, or have in his,
her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any die or dies, plate
or plates, brand or brands, engraving or engravings, on wood, stone, metal, or other
substance, moulds, or any false representation, likeness, copy, or colorable imitation
of any die, plate, brand, engraving, or mould of any private label, brand, stamp,
wrapper, engraving on paper or other substance, or trade-mark, registered pursuant
to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as
prescribed in the first section of this act.
Section 5. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person
or persons, knowingly and willfully make, forge, or counterfeit, or have in his, her,
or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any representation,
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the legislation could not be derived from the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution,20 the Court turned to the Commerce
Clause for an affirmative grant of congressional power.21 In doing
so, the Court searched for a jurisdictional element in the statute,22
noting that “[i]f . . . the statute described persons engaged in a
commerce between the different States, and related to the use of
trade-marks in such commerce, it would be evident that Congress
believed it was acting under the clause of the Constitution which
authorizes it to regulate commerce among the States.”23
The Court found no such jurisdictional element in the statute.24
Noting the broad language of the provision, the Court stated that
the Act’s “broad purpose was to establish a universal system of
trade-mark registration . . . without regard to the character of the
trade to which it was to be applied or the residence of the
owner . . . .”25 The Court then struck down the legislation as a
constitutionally inadequate exercise of congressional power.26
Implicit in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Trademark Cases is
likeness, similitude, copy, or colorable imitation of any private label, brand, stamp,
wrapper, engraving, mould, or trade-mark, registered pursuant to the Statutes of the
United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first
section of this act.
Id.
20

Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (“[W]e are unable to see any such power in the
constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and
discoveries.”).
21
See id. at 94–95.
22
See id. at 97. The Supreme Court still searches for a jurisdictional element in its
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000) (“[The statute] contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal
cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (“[The Statute] has no express
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions
that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”);
United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[The statute] also
contains no jurisdictional element as is commonly found in criminal statutes passed under
authority of the Commerce Clause. That is, there is no requirement that, for example, the
bootleg copies or phonorecords have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
23
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 97.
24
See id. at 98.
25
Id.
26
See id. at 99 (“The questions in each of these cases being an inquiry whether these
statutes can be upheld in whole or in part as valid and constitutional, must be answered in
the negative . . . .”).
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the premise that federal law not supported by the Copyright Clause
of the Constitution can nevertheless find support in the Commerce
Clause.27 The fact that the Court turned to the Commerce Clause
as a source of congressional power might imply that the Court
would have sustained the legislation if the Commerce Clause so
allowed.28
The Supreme Court has often searched for alternate forms of
congressional power to support legislation.29 The mere fact that
legislation cannot be promulgated under the Commerce Clause
does not mean that § 5 of the 14th Amendment could not grant
Congress the requisite power.30 Despite the general rule that
alternate congressional powers can support the same legislation,
the narrow scope of congressional power granted by the Copyright
Clause can be seen as an exception to this rule.31 The Copyright
Clause, applying to subject matter that is narrower than the subject

27

The structure of the Court’s analysis supports this premise. See id. at 94–95, 97
(turning to the Commerce Clause for support after dismissing the argument that the
legislation could find support in the Intellectual Property Clause).
28
See Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated
Originality as a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461,
1469 (1992) (“[T]he Court recognized that Congress still could rely on the Commerce
Clause as an alternative source of legislative power. Although the Court ultimately held
the legislation to be unconstitutional, the determination was due primarily to the
prevailing narrow view of ‘interstate’ commerce and the issue of severability.”) (citations
omitted); see also Brian Danitz, Comment, Martignon And Kiss Catalog: Can Live
Performances Be Protected?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1163
(2005) (“Although that Court found that the Act was not justified by the Commerce
Clause either, under the modern concept of the Commerce Clause, the Act would have
been upheld.”).
29
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78–80 (2000) (“Because we found the
ADEA valid under Congress’ Commerce Clause power, we concluded that it was
unnecessary to determine whether the Act also could be supported by Congress’ power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Resolution of today’s cases requires us to
decide that question.” (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983))); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1996) (searching for power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause after noting that the lower court
did not find the abrogation a valid exercise of the Interstate Commerce Clause or § 5 of
the 14th Amendment). See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964).
30
See Kimel, 582 U.S. at 80 (turning to Section 5 of the 14th Amendment to support
abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
31
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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matter regulated by the Commerce Clause,32 may either qualify the
protection of similar subject matter under the Commerce Clause33
or preclude regulation of the same subject matter under any other
constitutional grant of power.34
1. United States v. Moghadam
In determining whether copyright-like statutes could be upheld
under the Commerce Clause, modern courts have grappled with the
interpretive question of whether a narrower constitutional
provision qualifies a more general one or precludes any other
exercise of congressional power altogether. The Eleventh Circuit
in United States v. Moghadam35 held that the Commerce Clause
could support legislation imposing criminal sanctions for the
bootlegging of live performances.36 The difficulty in upholding
such a law as a valid exercise of the Intellectual Property Clause is
that live performances lack fixation.37 After noting that an
articulation of congressional power is not required in the statute,38
32
Compare id. (“[S]ecuring for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”), with id. at cl. 3 (“To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”).
33
This would be a direct consequence of applying the canon of statutory interpretation
mandating that specific provisions qualify general ones. The Supreme Court has applied
this canon before. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (“Finally,
our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more
specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern,
even if the general provision was enacted later.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 489–90 (1973))).
34
Such an interpretation would be the only other preclusive alternative to applying the
narrower provision as qualifying the more general. See, e.g., id. at 489 (“[T]he question
remains whether the specific federal habeas corpus statute, explicitly and historically
designed to provide the means for a state prisoner to attack the validity of his
confinement, must be understood to be the exclusive remedy available in a situation like
this where it so clearly applies.”).
35
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
36
See id. at 1277 (“We hold that the anti-bootlegging statute has a sufficient connection
to interstate and foreign commerce to meet the Lopez test.”).
37
Id. (“[W]e assume arguendo that the [Intellectual Property] Clause could not sustain
this legislation because live performances, being unfixed, are not encompassed by the
term ‘Writings’ which includes a fixation requirement.”).
38
See id. at 1275 n.10 (“Congress’s failure to cite the Commerce Clause as grounds for
[the statute] does not eliminate the possibility that the Commerce Clause can sustain this
legislation.”); see also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The
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the Eleventh Circuit, citing The Trademark Cases for support,39
noted that “the fact that legislation reaches beyond the limits of
one grant of legislative power has no bearing on whether it can be
sustained under another.”40
The Moghadam court entertained the argument that legislation
that fails under one constitutional grant of congressional power
cannot in some instances be upheld under another.41 The Eleventh
Circuit examined the Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.42 That case involved a statute
purportedly enacted under Congress’ commerce power that
overlapped with the protections afforded under the Bankruptcy
Clause of the Constitution.43 The Court in Railway Labor refused
to uphold the statute under the Commerce Clause after invalidating
it under the Bankruptcy Clause.44 The Court reasoned that “if we
were to hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals
of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (“An otherwise valid exercise of
congressional authority is not, of course, invalidated if Congress happens to recite the
wrong clause . . . or, indeed, if Congress recites no clause at all.” (citing Woods, 333 U.S.
at 144)); cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (“It is in the nature of our
review of congressional legislation defended on the basis of Congress’ powers under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to discern some legislative purpose or
factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power. That does not mean, however,
that Congress need anywhere recite the words ‘section 5’ or ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ or
‘equal protection.’” (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476–78 (1980)));
Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir. 1983) (“The omission of any
ritualistic incantation of powers by the Congress is not determinative, for there is no
requirement that the statute incorporate buzz words such as ‘Fourteenth Amendment’ or
‘section 5’ or ‘equal protection.’” (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 n.18)).
39
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1278 (“Although the 1876 Act did not survive due to the
restrictive view of the Commerce Clause prevailing at that time, the Supreme Court’s
analysis in the Trade-Mark Cases stands for the proposition that legislation which would
not be permitted under the Copyright Clause could nonetheless be permitted under the
Commerce Clause, provided that the independent requirements of the latter are met.”).
40
Id. at 1277 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250
(1964)); see also Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir.1986)
(“[T]he copyright clause is not the only constitutional source of congressional
power . . . .”).
41
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
42
455 U.S. 457 (1982).
43
Id. at 466; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
44
Ry. Labor, 455 U.S. 468–69.
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bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”45
The same difficulty arose in Moghadam. Since the Intellectual
Property Clause is dramatically narrower than the Commerce
Clause, upholding the statute under the broader clause would
enable Congress to circumvent the boundaries of the Intellectual
Property Clause. In that case the statute would protect subject
matter normally protected under the Intellectual Property Clause,
but without the fixation requirement.46 The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that “in some circumstances the Commerce Clause
indeed may be used to accomplish that which may not have been
permissible under the [Intellectual Property] Clause. We hold that
the instant case is one such circumstance in which the Commerce
Clause may be thus used.”47
The Moghadam court held that because the term “writings” in
the Intellectual Property Clause imposes the fixation requirement,
the term does not create a constitutional ceiling on the types of
works that can be protected by Congress, and, therefore, the
tension between broad and narrow clauses noted in the Railway
Labor case was not a preclusive issue in the case before the
court.48
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the question of whether the
statute was a proper exercise of the commerce power. Just as the
Supreme Court did in the Trademark Cases, the Moghadam court
searched for a jurisdictional element and found none.49 The
Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the absence of such an
element was not dispositive and upheld the statute, stating that
“[t]he link between bootleg compact discs and interstate commerce

45

Id.
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
47
Id.
48
See id. at 1280–81 (“The grant itself is stated in positive terms, and does not imply
any negative pregnant that suggests that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on
Congress’ ability to legislate pursuant to other grants.”).
49
Id. at 1275 (“[T]here is no requirement that, for example, the bootleg copies or
phonorecords have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.”); see supra text
accompanying notes 20–27 (discussing the Trademark Cases).
46
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and commerce with foreign nations is self-evident.”50 The court
cited two reasons. First, the court analogized the case to Wickard
v. Filburn51 and noted that the existence of bootlegged works
depresses the market for legitimate copies of the work.52 Second,
the Moghadam court noted that the very fact that bootlegging of a
work occurs coupled with a market for such bootlegs implies that
the artists involved are recognized nationally.53
The Moghadam opinion illustrates that once a court decides
that legislation can be sustained under the Commerce Clause even
though the legislation cannot be sustained under the Intellectual
Property Clause, the issue of whether the statute is a valid exercise
of the commerce power is rarely difficult to resolve. The crucial
issue is whether the Intellectual Property Clause qualifies or
precludes the exercise of power under an alternative constitutional
power. The Moghadam court held that even though an exercise of
power under the Commerce Clause would circumvent the fixation
requirement under the Intellectual Property Clause, “[c]ommon
sense does not indicate that extending copyright-like protection to
a live performance is fundamentally inconsistent with the
[Intellectual Property] Clause.”54 Thus, the Moghadam court
decided not to impose any constraints on Congress when its
plenary commerce authority overlaps with its power to protect
intellectual property.55 The core of the issue is whether regulating
under the Commerce Clause would undermine the integrity of the
narrower Intellectual Property Clause. The Moghadam court
decided this issue in the negative.56

50

See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
52
Wickard held that the federally imposed wheat production caps applied to homegrown wheat because of the effect of the illegitimate wheat on the national market. 317
U.S. at 127–28.
53
See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“Generally speaking, performing artists who
attract bootleggers are those who are sufficiently popular that their appeal crosses state or
national lines.”).
54
Id. at 1281.
55
However, the court withheld definitive judgment regarding the use of the Commerce
Clause to circumvent the Intellectual Property Clause where the two clauses are
fundamentally inconsistent. See id. at 1281 n.12.
56
See id. at 1281–82.
51
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2. United States v. Martignon
The most notable case after Moghadam is United States v.
Martignon.57 In that case, the Second Circuit considered the
validity of an anti-bootlegging statute.58 The statute was a product
of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), specifically the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).59
Upon
congressional approval of TRIPs, Congress codified the provisions
of the statute in 1994.60 The statute imposed criminal sanctions on
bootlegging activity.61 This was the same statute at issue in
Moghadam. The Second Circuit, however, framed the issue as
“whether the Copyright Clause’s limitations also limit Congress’
power to regulate creative works under the Commerce Clause.”62
The court examined the text of the Copyright Clause directly,
noting that “it is not clear from the wording of the Copyright
Clause where the grant of power ends and where the limitation(s)

57

346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
See generally id. The anti-bootlegging statute discussed in Martignon is codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000 & Supp. II. 2002) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319A
(West 2006)). The portion of the statute at issue in the case provided as follows:
(a) OFFENSE.—Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers
involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain—
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in a copy or
phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a performance from an
unauthorized fixation;
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or sounds and
images of a live musical performance; or
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers to rent, or
traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in paragraph (1), regardless of
whether the fixations occurred in the United States;
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years . . . .
Id.
59
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420; see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter “TRIPs”].
60
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000)).
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.
62
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144.
58
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begin(s).”63 The court noted that in Heart of Atlanta, the court
upheld civil rights litigation under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment despite its invalidity under the commerce clause.64
Conversely, the court also noted that some cases, such as Gibbons,
which held that because the bankruptcy and commerce clauses are
“intimately connected,” legislation that fails under the Bankruptcy
Clause could not be enacted as Commerce legislation.65
Given the indeterminacy in the case law, the Second Circuit
noted that there were two ways to determine whether commerce
legislation falls within the scope of the Intellectual Property
Clause.66 The first approach would require the court to examine
the text of the Constitution to decide whether legislation could
plausibly fall within the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause.67
Interpreting the word “secure,” the court noted that any law that
“creates, bestows, or allocates rights” would fall within the bounds
of the Clause under such an approach.68 Using a second approach,
the court could examine the history and context of the clause to
determine its scope.69 Under this approach, the court noted that for
a law to be considered a copyright law it would have to at least
confer property rights.70
The court noted that under either approach, the statute would
not fall within the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause. The
court reasoned that the statute was a criminal law, neither creating
nor allocating property rights to authors and inventors.71 Under the
first approach, the criminal law would not create, bestow, or
allocate rights, and under the second approach, the law did not
create any property rights.72 The statute did not grant private rights
to exclude others from a property interest in the live

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 145.
See id. at 146 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 260–61).
Id. (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465–66).
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 149–50.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Martignon, 492 F.3d at 151.
Id.
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performance.73 Instead, the law granted government the power to
protect the interests of owners of preexisting property rights.74
Another integral part of the court’s scope analysis was the
comparison of the rights created under the statute to the rights
created under § 106 of the Copyright Act.75 The court made the
comparison to determine how different the statute was from the
Copyright Act, which would clearly be within the scope of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution. Ultimately, the
court noted that § 2319A does not create, bestow, or allocate
property rights in expression, it does not share the defining
characteristics of other laws that are concededly “copyright laws,”
and it differs significantly from the Copyright Act that was passed
pursuant to the Copyright Clause (and that is valid under it).”
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the law fell outside of
the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution,
avoiding the direct balancing of the Clauses.76
3. Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport International
Productions, Inc.
A district court in California considered a similar issue. In Kiss
Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport International Productions, Inc.,77 a judge
in the Central District of California considered whether an antibootlegging statute could be sustained under the Commerce Clause
even if it violated the limited times provision of the Intellectual
Property Clause.78 That court, however, avoided the question
altogether by holding that the statute did not fall under the subject
matter regulated under the mandate of the Intellectual Property
Clause.79 This removed any possibility the statute circumvented
the Constitution’s originality and limited times requirements
because it was not subject to those requirements in the first place.

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1176.
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Unfettered by a qualifying Intellectual Property, the court found
the statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause.80
The court noted that:
[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not
fall within the purview of the [Intellectual Property]
Clause, it need not consider whether it complies
with the limitations of the [Intellectual Property]
Clause. To do so imports into the Commerce
Clause limits that clause does not have. That the
Statute might provide “copyright-like” or
“copyright-related” protection to matters clearly not
covered by the [Intellectual Property] Clause is not
important. One need only find an alternative source
of constitutional authority.81
The court found the fact that the legislation was “copyrightlike” immaterial,82 and rather emphasized the fact that
constitutional sources of authority are fungible.83 Like the court in
Moghadam, the Kiss Catalog court avoids the tension between the
Commerce and Copyright Clauses by finding no conflict at all.84
Doing so avoids the question of whether the Intellectual Property
Clause qualifies the exercise of Commerce Clause power when the
exercise of that power results in copyright-like legislation.
The broadest interpretation of Kiss Catalog would imply that
subject matter that does not fall under the current application of the
Intellectual Property Clause could be regulated under an alternative
source of constitutional power.85 The difficulty of such an
interpretation is that it becomes problematic if one assumes that
Congress is not exercising the ceiling of its Intellectual Property
Clause powers. If Congress later decides to regulate subject matter
it can but has not before regulated under the Intellectual Property
Clause, what happens to existing Commerce Clause legislation on
80

Id.
Id. at 1175.
82
Id.
83
Id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84
Kiss Catalog, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d
1269, 1280).
85
See id. at 1176.
81
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point? A court following Kiss Catalog would eventually have to
confront the question this court avoided—whether the narrower
clause qualifies the more general.
B. The Treaty Power
Article II of the Constitution vests power in the executive to
negotiate and sign treaties that receive the full force of United
States law upon ratification by two-thirds of the Senate.86 The
product of this power, when coupled with the Supremacy Clause,87
receives preemptive force against the states.88 Thus, a treaty
signed by the President and ratified by the Senate would not be
differentiable in effect from a law passed through the traditional
legislative process.89 Yet because such a law would be passed
pursuant to an Article II power, the constraints of the Article I
Intellectual Property Clause may not fully apply.
Although a treaty cannot authorize what the Constitution does
not allow,90 the line between what the Constitution prohibits and
what it does not affirmatively permit is blurry at best. Arguably
86

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have the power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.”).
87
Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (noting that treaties become the supreme law of the land upon
ratification).
88
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (“When the national
government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights,
privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme
law of the land. No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or
statute.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“The treaties were
of no greater legal obligation than the act of congress. By the [C]onstitution, laws made
in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are both
declared to be the supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one
over the other.”); Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that a state law was preempted by an air carriage treaty).
89
See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600.
90
See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (“The treaty-making power
of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and,
though it does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,’ it does
extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations.”);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1924) (“The treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is
whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment.”).
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constraints in Article I do not extend to treaties promulgated under
Article II.91 If the Intellectual Property Clause does not prohibit
copyright-like legislation that does not impose the constitutional
constraints of the Clause, such as the limited times provision,
under the authority of another constitutional power, a treaty that
disposes of such a requirement would not conflict with the Article
I provision. And even if there is a conflict, it can be argued that
the horizontal constraints in the Article I provisions do not carry
over to an exercise of an Article II power.92 Such an argument,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note.93
C. The Spending Power
Congress has broad powers to spend federal funds on state
programs.94 This broad power can be used to condition the grant
of federal funds on state compliance with federally imposed
conditions and is subject to several constraints. First, the condition
on federal funds must be unambiguously stated.95 Second, the use
of the federal funds must be for the “general welfare.”96 Third, the
use of federal funds must relate to a federal program.97 Fourth,

91
See Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time?
Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1079, 1113–17 (2006) (arguing that the horizontal limitations of Article I can be
circumvented when Congress acts pursuant to its Article II power).
92
See id.
93
For an excellent discussion of the effect of the Article II treaty power on the Article I
Intellectual Property Clause see generally id. at 1113–17.
94
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987).
95
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(“[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract—in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
‘contract.’” (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–98 (1937); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980))).
96
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“The first of these limitations is derived from the
language of the Constitution itself—the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit
of ‘the general welfare.’” (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936))).
97
See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (“[The conditions
must be] reasonably related to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs.”).
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another provision of the Constitution may curtail the spending
power.98
One can easily conceive of a federal funding program that
conditions federal funds on state implementation of a federal
scheme of copyright-like protection. The validity of these state
laws would largely depend on whether the Intellectual Property
Clause would qualify the spending power and whether the state
law would be preempted by the federal copyright scheme.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act requires that all state laws
regulating the subject matter within the purview of the Copyright
Act and that provide rights equivalent to those afforded by the Act
must be preempted.99 A state law that regulates copyright-like
subject matter would fall under the umbrella of subject matter
typically regulated by the Copyright Act.100 If the statute did not
protect distribution, copying, or derivative work rights that were

98

See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269–70
(1985) (“Congress may impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, absent some
independent constitutional bar.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968) (“There is of course no question that the
Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may
impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be
disbursed, and that any state law or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and
conditions is to that extent invalid.” (citing Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947))).
99
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title.”); see
also Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that only rights
equivalent to those protected under the copyright act would be preempted); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Section
301(a) precludes enforcement of any state cause of action which is equivalent in
substance to a federal copyright infringement claim.”).
100
Works that would not receive federal copyright protection can still fall under the
subject matter regulated by the copyright act. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256
F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter extends
beyond the tangible expressions that can be protected under the Act to elements of
expression which themselves cannot be protected.”); NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Section 301 preemption bars state law misappropriation claims
with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements.”).
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equivalent to those afforded by § 106 of the Copyright Act, such a
law would be valid.101
That is, unless the four requirements of the Taxing and
Spending Power test—which leave open the possibility that
another clause in the Constitution could curtail congressional
power102—would bar a condition on federal funds that would
demand the implementation of a federal quasi-copyright scheme.
The fourth requirement notes that another provision of the
Constitution can constrain the spending power. Thus, under the
Taxing and Spending Power, a court would have to face the same
issue it faces under Commerce Clause cases103—whether a law
passed under an alternative legislative power could be used to
circumvent the constraints of a narrower provision.
D. Problems Arising from Protecting Works Within the Subject
Matter of Copyright Under an Alternative Constitutional
Power
Regardless of which constitutional power is used as an
alternative to the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution,
the validity of such an exercise of power would depend on the
tradeoff made between applying the constraints of a narrow
constitutional provision and a policy of allowing Congress to
exercise their broader constitutional powers to effectuate an
identical purpose without the same constraints. Does the fact that a
constitutional provision targets a specific type of subject matter
make it the exclusive arbiter of that subject matter? At the core of
such determinations are important policy considerations. Are the
originality104 and “Limited Times”105 requirements embedded in
the Intellectual Property Clause vital to the maintenance of a
federal intellectual property protection scheme?
101

See supra note 99; see also § 301(b)(3). Section 301(b)(3) is the mirror image of
301(a), noting that laws that are not equivalent will not be preempted. Id.
102
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103
See discussion supra Part II.A.
104
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991)
(“Originality requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement
independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work),
and that it display some minimal level of creativity.”).
105
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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The constitutional and judicially imposed requirements derived
from the Intellectual Property Clause address themselves to two
broader problems. First, because American courts have interpreted
the Intellectual Property Clause as allowing a division between
patent and copyright law,106 maintaining the more stringent
requirements for obtaining a patent depends on a wall of separation
between the subject matter protected by copyright and patent
laws.107 Otherwise, individuals will be faced with an incentive to
forgo the intensive patent examination process in favor of the more
lax requirements of copyright law.
Second, absent the
requirements of originality, idea-expression, and fixation, there
would be significant difficulty in defining the property right
protected by federal copyright law.
1. Enforcing the Asymmetrical Examination and Registration
Processes of Copyright and Patent Law
While copyright law has created a division between the
protection of idea and expression,108 the patent law makes no such
distinction.109 The idea-expression doctrine has become an
axiomatic fixture of the federal scheme of copyright protection.110
The most obvious function of this doctrine is to enforce the
106

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) (“Further distinguishing the two
kinds of intellectual property, copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge.
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from
her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others of
the inventor’s knowledge.”) (citation omitted); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (“On that account, we have often distinguished between
the limited protection accorded a copyright owner and the extensive protection granted a
patent owner.”).
107
See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103 (maintaining that a distinction between a
stronger patent protection and a weaker copyright protection requires that the two bodies
of law be kept distinct).
108
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
109
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”); see also Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Espiritu, 284 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434 (S.D. W. Va.
2003) (“A patent is required to protect an idea isolated from any original expression.”).
110
See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976) (“It is
an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyrightable work extends
only to the particular expression of an idea and never to the idea itself.”).
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separation between the subject matter protected by patents and
copyrights. Patents protect ideas and copyrights protect the
expression of ideas.111 The government vests the patent property
right under more stringent conditions,112 and copyright protection
under a lax if not non-existent examination process.113
Absent this separation, individuals could choose which type of
property right they prefer. Although protection of patents are quite
different than the protections afforded under the copyright laws in
that copyright protection does not extend to ideas,114 individuals
weighing the benefits of protection against the substantial cost of
the patent examination and prosecution process may chose to
employ the copyright laws rather than the patent laws if both the
patent and the copyright schemes protected ideas. Given the
ability to protect the underlying idea of a work, the Copyright Act
could be used to create government sanctioned monopolies not too
different in effect from a patent. In other words, if given the
choice between a long, onerous, and costly patent examination
process and the lax registration requirements for enforcing
copyrights in court, there is little incentive to choose the
intellectual property right that is more difficult to obtain.
Legislation under an alternative grant of congressional power
would pose the same problem posed by removing the wall of
separation between idea and expression in copyright. If the ideaexpression doctrine is not incorporated into the alternative grant of
power, individuals will be faced with the aforementioned incentive
to subvert the stringent requirements of the patent laws by seeking
the protection of ideas under an alternative copyright-like statute.

111
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea—not the idea itself.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing the idea-expression dichotomy in terms of the
division between patent and copyright protection).
112
See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215 (“[D]esign patents require the critical examination given
patents to protect the public against monopoly.”).
113
While registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright, see 17
U.S.C. § 410(c), registration does not require a thorough examination process.
114
See id. § 102(b).

BATHAEE_121307_FINAL

2008]

12/13/2007 10:14:51 PM

A CONSTITUTIONAL IDEA-EXPRESSION DOCTRINE

463

2. Difficulties in Defining the Property Right
Many of the judicial doctrines in copyright law serve the
objective of protecting the intangible.115 Intellectual property
rights are, to some extent, a legal fiction.116 The law vests property
rights in the intangible. The material world does not provide the
traditional metes and bounds to products of the mind as it does to
property composed of matter. It falls upon the law to serve the
function of defining to what extent a property right vests in such
works.
The fixation requirement reduces the intractable problem of
protecting something that exists only in the mind. By requiring
works to be expressed in a tangible and permanent medium prior to
being protected,117 the fixation requirement reinforces the barrier
between idea and expression at the core of copyright protection.118
A work cannot be protected until it is expressed and works that
exist only in the mind receive no special treatment.
Absent a requirement that works be fixed, courts will have to
grapple with the metaphysical question of defining the limits of a
property right that has no permanent physical manifestation.
While an unauthorized recording of a live musical performance,
115

See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11 (1908) (“Musical
compositions mentioned as the subject of copyright are tangible and legible embodiments
of the intellectual product of the musician, and not the intangible intellectual product
itself.”); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984) (“We hold
that the intangible idea protected by the copyright is effectively made tangible by its
embodiment upon the [medium].”).
116
Report, American Bar Association Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project, Achieving
Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues
Created by the Internet, 55 BUS. LAW. 1801, 1899 (“All intellectual property interests are
intangible, and legal fictions are used to localize these interests.”).
117
See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l., Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
873–74 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The fixation requirement is defined in section 101 in relevant
part as follows: A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
118
For example, the inability to mark off the metes and bounds of speech during an
interview with Ernest Hemingway prevented a court deciding whether to protect the
contents of the interview from granting a common law copyright. This was largely due to
a lack of fixation. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346
(1968).
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for example, may give rise to liability, it is unclear where liability
stops. What constitutes a live performance? When does the
performance end? Is the author entitled to a sequence of three
repetitive notes performed live? Many of the answers that one
naturally provides to solve these problems stem from the rich
doctrine developed in copyright law. For example, the repetitive
notes may invoke the merger doctrine. Yet when Congress enacts
legislation pursuant to its commerce power, do these doctrines
come with such legislation?
The next section will discuss an important doctrine of
copyright law—the idea-expression doctrine. This doctrine is the
encapsulating term for the notion that copyright protects
expression not ideas and the facilitating corollary doctrines of fair
use and merger. After discussing the origins, purpose, and
facilitating doctrines of the idea-expression doctrine, this Note will
again pose the question of what effect copyright doctrines have on
legislation promulgated pursuant to an alternative grant of
constitutional power. This Note will argue that the doctrine of
idea-expression and its corollaries are constitutional requirements
that must constrain any alternative constitutional power when used
to pass copyright-like legislation.
III. THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND ITS COROLLARY
DOCTRINES: FACILITATING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Apart from the doctrine’s most obvious application—
maintaining the separation between patent and copyright
protection—the doctrine delineates the scope of intellectual
property rights through several corollary doctrines. The Fair Use
doctrine, for example, allows some flexibility in the property right
to ensure that others can build on the ideas that protected
expression is predicated on.119 Part of the primary function of the
Fair Use doctrine is not only to provide access to the underlying
ideas of a work, but also to keep idea and expression separate from

119

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (“[T]he ‘fair use’ defense allows
the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also
expression itself in certain circumstances.”).
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each other.120 It allows individuals to distinguish idea from
expression and to determine at what point private rights end and
the public domain begins.121
Likewise, the judicially created conceptual separability tests
also enforce the line between idea and expression. Coupled with
the Merger Doctrine, courts ensure that underlying ideas are easily
accessible to the public by preventing the protection of works in
which expression and ideas are indistinguishable from one another.
This section will explore the origins of the idea-expression
doctrine along with its modern applications through various
judicially created doctrines. This section will also look at specific
examples in which idea and expression typically run a high risk of
merger, such as in computer software and functional art. The
doctrine is not only a judicially created policy, but also the
cornerstone of maintaining intellectual property rights without
compromising the public benefit for which such rights were
created in the first place.
A. The Pragmatic Genesis of the Idea-Expression Distinction
The early distinction between idea and expression was
premised on the intangibility of ideas. Since one cannot divine
what exists in another’s mind, ideas cannot be protected until they
are expressed.122 The difficulty lies in establishing the metes and
bounds of a property right that exists solely in the mind and in the
little use such an embodiment of an idea would have to the
cumulative creation of new works.123
120

See id. at 219 (“[Fair Use] distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes
only the latter eligible for copyright protection.”).
121
See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“[Reverse engineering fair use allows users] to distinguish the protected from the
unprotected elements of [a computer program].”).
122
See infra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
123
See Clayton v. Stone & Hall, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872)
(“The term ‘science’ cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating
and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price-current, the subject-matter of which is
daily changing, and is of mere temporary use.”). Courts attempting to fix common law
copyright protection in unfixed works have struggled with defining the property right.
The New York Court of Appeals considered a claim by the estate of Ernest Hemingway
seeking to protect Hemingway’s utterances during an interview under a theory of
common law copyright. See Estate of Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 346 (1968). That court
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Early courts that decided whether the ideas underlying works
are copyrightable examined the approach taken by English courts
interpreting the Statute of Anne.124 The Supreme Court in Holmes
v. Hurst125 quoted Justice Erle in Jefferys v. Boosey in defining the
property right vested by the copyright laws and noted that “[t]he
subject of property is the order of words in the author’s
composition, not the words themselves . . . nor the ideas expressed
by those words, they existing in the mind alone, which is not
capable of appropriation.”126
A second difficulty that gave rise to the distinction between
idea and expression is the possibility of protecting both the
expressive and utilitarian elements of a copyrighted work. The
origin of the doctrine is largely attributable to the seminal Supreme
Court Case of Baker v. Selden.127 In that case the Court decided
whether a book that included forms for a method of bookkeeping
were protected under the copyright laws.128 The Supreme Court
held that the forms were not protected because doing so may result
in protecting the method of accounting concomitant with using the
forms to record financial data.129
Although the Court did not do so explicitly, it implicitly
announced a distinction between ideas and the expression of ideas.
The Court noted that the illustrations in the book describing the
method of bookkeeping:
are the mere language employed by the author to
convey his ideas more clearly. Had he used words
of description instead of diagrams (which merely
stated that “[a]ssuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law copyright
in certain limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very
least, be required that the speaker indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in
question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique
statement and that he wished to exercise control over its publication.” Id. at 349.
124
See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85–86 (1899); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 595 (1834); Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591, 593
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Myers v. Callaghan, 5 F. 726, 732 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881); Lawrence
v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 34 (C.C. D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
125
Holmes, 174 U.S. 82.
126
Id. at 86 (quoting Jefferys v. Boosey, (1854) 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702 (H.L.)).
127
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
128
Id. at 100–01.
129
Id. at 107.
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stand in the place of words), there could not be the
slightest doubt that others, applying the art to
practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and
diagrams which were in the author’s mind, and
which he thus described by words in his book.130
The Court further noted that given the purpose of the copyright
laws—to spur the creation of new works based on old ideas—
protecting the system of bookkeeping described in the book would
mean that “knowledge could not be used without incurring the
guilt of piracy of the book.”131 The book would protect not just the
expressive description of the method of bookkeeping but the
method itself.132
The fundamental risk in protecting the utility of the work is
that such protection would lock up the ideas underlying the method
of bookkeeping because the method of bookkeeping—the process
itself—is the underlying idea of the work. Accordingly, the Baker
Court noted:
The description of the art in a book, though entitled
to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an
exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the
one is explanation; the object of the other is use.
The former may be secured by copyright. The latter
can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by
letters-patent.133
Thus, the difficulty in divorcing the idea behind a utilitarian work
from the utility of the work gave rise to a distinction between the
protections of the patent and copyright laws.
The distinction between idea and expression arose because of
two problems inherent in protecting ideas. First, because an idea is
intangible and unexpressed, the contours of a property right in
ideas would be amorphously defined. Second, in works straddling
the line between being utilitarian and expressive, protecting the
utilitarian aspects of the work would mean possibly protecting the
130
131
132
133

Id. at 103.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 105.
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ideas intertwined with the utility of the work. The purpose of
making the distinction is one of necessity; absent such a distinction
the property right would not take concrete form.
B. The Modern Application of the Idea-Expression Doctrine and
Its Corollaries
The judicially created doctrine has given rise to codification in
§ 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.134 That provision states that
“[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”135
The idea-expression dichotomy embodies the premise that
“[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—
not the idea itself.”136 This doctrine has been applied in several
situations, primarily when either protecting the expression would
potentially protect the underlying ideas of the work or when a
work is so intertwined with the underlying ideas that the two
cannot be distinguished.137
Two types of works are problematic when distinguishing
between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas. First,
functional art tends to blur the lines between idea and expression
because the artistic features of a work may also serve some
functional purpose.138 Second, software—in its most expressive
134

See H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 57 (“Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the
scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between
expression and idea remains unchanged.”).
135
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
136
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–18 (1954) (citations omitted).
137
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (stating that
a compilation of facts in a directory lacks originality); Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 (stating that
a copyright on a work of mathematical science cannot give an exclusive right over the
methods of operation or the diagrams used to explain those methods).
138
See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff’d, 205 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1953) (addressing the issue of whether a registered sculpture is utilitarian in
purpose and character).
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form being written in a computer language and in its most
utilitarian form no more than a series of machine instructions—
tends to straddle the line between a method of operation and an
expressive literary work.139
This section will examine the application of the ideaexpression doctrine within the context of computer software and
utilitarian works of art. Moreover, this section will also discuss
two doctrinal corollaries to the idea-expression doctrine, the
Merger and Fair Use Doctrines.
1. The Line Between Utility and Expression in
Computer Software
The idea-expression dichotomy has given rise to extensive
litigation over copyright protection of the non-literal elements of
software.140 Computer software, being no more than a series of
computer instructions, can be viewed as indistinguishable from a
recipe141 or, as the styled by the statute, “a method of operation.”142
139

See Pamela Samuelson et. al, Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2351 (1994) (noting that § 102(b)
precludes copyrighting of methods of operation, but program behavior can by
copyrightable when it is expressive).
140
Jack George Abid, Software Patents On Both Sides Of The Atlantic, 23 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 815, 822 (2005) (“With copyright protection for software well
established, software firms, especially in the U.S., began to seek broader intellectual
property protection for their software by filing copyright infringement suits alleging nonliteral infringement against competing firms using questionable tactics.”); Jacob A.
Gantz, [Private] Order[ing] in the Court?: How the Circuit Courts Should Resolve the
Current Conflict Over Reverse Engineering Clauses in Mass Market Licenses, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 999, 1004 (2005) (“After Apple, a ‘second generation’ of cases arose that
challenged the limits of protection afforded to computer software.” (quoting ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 872 (Aspen
3d ed. 2003))).
141
Some courts have chosen to protect, although not directly, recipes. See Fargo
Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823, 828 (8th Cir. 1924) (“[Recipes] are
not a mere advertisement; they are original compositions, and serve a useful purpose,
apart from the mere advertisement of the article itself. They serve to advance the
culinary art.”). Yet, most courts do not protect recipes unless the author elaborates on the
recipe. See Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The
recipes involved in this case comprise the lists of required ingredients and the directions
for combining them to achieve the final products. The recipes contain no expressive
elaboration upon either of these functional components, as opposed to recipes that might
spice up functional directives by weaving in creative narrative. We do not express any
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Yet, courts have long since protected software as literary works
since the source code and object code often express the ideas
underlying what the program ultimately accomplishes.143
A program, being a functionally driven work, is often difficult
to parse for idea and expression.144 Courts have been faced with a
choice either to protect only the literal elements of the work, such
as the instructions or computer language expression, or to protect
the non-literal elements just as courts protect the plot of a novel or
other literary work.145 Courts have chosen to walk the fine line of
protecting both literal and non-literal elements of source code, but
only to the extent that they are expressive and do not embody the
underlying ideas of the code.146
The most prominent debate over the protection of non-literal
elements of source code is whether the structure, sequence, and
organization of a computer program can be protected.147 On one
hand, the true value in source code is the organizational approach
taken by the author, simply because one method of writing a

opinion whether recipes are or are not per se amenable to copyright protection, for it
would be inappropriate to do so.”).
142
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
143
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476–77 (9th Cir.1992)
(“[A]t least some computer programs bear significant similarities to literary works.”);
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that the
copyright act treats software as literary works.”).
144
See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993)
(“Determining which elements of a program are protectable is a difficult task.”); see also
Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1989) (“Computer software, by its very nature
as written work intended to serve utilitarian purposes, defies easy categorization within
our intellectual property system.”).
145
Menell, supra note 144, at 1046 (noting the emergence of copyright infringement
suits involving non-literal forms of copying).
146
Id. at 1049.
147
Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d
Cir. 1986) (protecting structure, sequence, and organization), with Computer Assocs.
Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544, 560–61 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 982 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1992) (holding that such protection would be too broad). The United States
Copyright Office does not register works based solely on the structure, sequence, and
organization of a computer program. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for
Computer Programs (Circular 61), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007).
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program may be more efficient than another that accomplishes the
same functional task.148
This is particularly true in the realm of object-oriented
programming,149 which requires programmers to create a hierarchy
of objects or data structures.150 Object-oriented programming
allows a programmer to define an object,151 for example a cat, give
the object properties inherent in all cats, and when the programmer
wants to create a narrower version of such an object, such as a lion,
she would avoid reinventing the wheel152 by inheriting a new
object “lion” as a kind of “cat.” The hierarchy created by the
programmer may warrant protection, although such a hierarchy is
not explicit in the code.
Even in sequential programming models, there is essentially
some ingenuity in between the lines. Instructions are grouped into
subroutines, and subroutines are executed in a particular order,
giving rise to an ultimate functional effect.
Moreover, there is the problem of abstraction that exists in
virtually any literary work.153 Just as a Shakespearian sonnet can
be characterized as an aggregation of characters, an aggregation of
words, an aggregation of sentences, or the overarching structure of
iambic pentameter, so too can computer software be characterized
in myriad different ways. Yet, there is a problem unique to
148

See Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that efficiency concerns may narrow the universe of ways individuals can write a
computer subroutine).
149
For an excellent discussion about object oriented programming, see Jacqueline D.
Lipton, IP’s Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software Protection, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 205, 228–29 (2006).
150
See id. at 228.
151
See id.
152
See id. at 229.
153
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (L. Hand, J.) (“Upon any
work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might
consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas’, to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.” (citing Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899))); see also Michael D. Murray Copyright, Originality, and
the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L.
REV. 779, 791–93 (2006) (discussing the Nichols case).
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computer programs. The lower the level of abstraction, the more
computer software approaches becoming no more than a method or
system of operation.154
The Third Circuit first dealt with this problem by applying a
broad rule expansively protecting the non-literal elements of code.
That court in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratories, Inc.,155 addressed the question of whether a program
created by translating a program written in one programming
language into another could be an infringement of the original
work.156 In essence, the court had to decide whether the
underlying structure of the code was protected or whether only the
literal elements of the code were protected.157
In holding that copyright law protected the organization of the
computer program the court reasoned:
As the program structure is refined, the programmer
must make decisions about what data are needed,
where along the program’s operations the data
should be introduced, how the data should be
inputted, and how it should be combined with other
data. The arrangement of the data is accomplished
by means of data files . . . and is affected by the
details of the program’s subroutines and modules,
for different arrangements of subroutines and
modules may require data in different forms. Once
again, there are numerous ways the programmer can
solve the data-organization problems she or he
154

Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994) (“But as
one moves away from the literal code to more general levels of a program, it becomes
more difficult to distinguish between unprotectible ideas, processes, methods or
functions, on one hand, and copyrightable expression on the other.”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (“Drawing the line too
liberally in favor of copyright protection would bestow strong monopolies over specific
applications upon the first to write programs performing those applications and would
thereby inhibit other creators from developing improved products. Drawing the line too
conservatively would allow programmer’s efforts to be copied easily, thus discouraging
the creation of all but modest incremental advances.”) (quoting Menell, Scope of
Copyright Protection for Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1047–48 (1989)).
155
797 F.2d. 1222 (1986).
156
Id. at 1224.
157
Id.
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faces.
Each solution may have particular
characteristics—efficiencies
or
inefficiencies,
conveniences or quirks—that differentiate it from
other solutions and make the overall program more
or less desirable.158
The Third Circuit thus implicitly noted that the ultimate choice
in the mode of dealing with the data-organization problems posed
by a programming task were in effect the valuable aspects of a
computer program.159 The court emphasized the comparative
value of the structure of a program in comparison to the value of
the actual coding by noting that “the coding process is a
comparatively small part of programming.”160
The Whelan court chose to protect non-literal elements because
other types of literary works can be infringed upon even though
there is no literal copying of the original work.161 Since computer
programs have been interpreted to be literary works162 the same
reasoning should therefore apply. The court thus articulated the
following test:

158

Id. at 1230.
See id.
160
Id. at 1231.
161
Id. at 1234 (“The copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when
there is no substantial similarity between the works’ literal elements.”); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting
similarities in the plots of two different literary works); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that copyright must protect against
immaterial variations on literal elements).
162
Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 885 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that software is protected
as a literary work under the 1976 Act); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A] computer program can be the subject of a copyright as a
literary text.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“Written computer programs are copyrightable as literary works.”); Corsearch, Inc. v.
Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 322 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that
definition of a literary work includes databases); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54
(1976) (“[The definition of literary work] includes computer data bases and computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.”); S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 50–
51 (1975).
159
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[T]he line between idea and expression may be
drawn with reference to the end sought to be
achieved by the work in question. In other words,
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not
necessary to that purpose or function would be part
of the expression of the idea. Where there are
various means of achieving the desired purpose,
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to
the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.163
Conflating computer programs with other literary works,
however, proved dangerous. Protecting computer programs as
literary works could result in simultaneously protecting the
underlying method of operation or idea. This heightened risk of
overprotecting computer programs may counsel against a more
cautious protection. Soon after Whelan, courts began to question
the Third Circuit’s reasoning.164 Among the most prominent
criticisms of the Whelan decision was that the Whelan rule of
protecting the structure, sequence, and organization of a computer
program implicitly assumed that idea could always be separated
from expression in computer programs, allowing a court to protect
only the portions of a computer program that warrant copyright
protection. In quoting Professor Nimmer’s treatise, the court in
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc. stated that “‘[t]he
crucial flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’

163

Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (citation omitted).
See CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (1992) (“The sheer
simplicity of the Third Circuit’s idea/expression analysis tempts the Court to adopt its
test. Unfortunately, the simplicity that makes the test so attractive, also makes it
conceptually overbroad and descriptively inadequate.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Computer Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560–61
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Whelan, therefore, is
fundamentally flawed . . . by failing to distinguish between the static and dynamic views
of a program.”); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT,§ 13.03[F][1] (2006) [hereinafter “NIMMER”] (“The crucial flaw in this
reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ in copyright law terms, underlies any
computer program, and that once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must
be expression.”); Steven R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?:
Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of The Structure of Computer Programs,
88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 882 (1990).
164
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in copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that
once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must be
expression.’”165
Applying the structure, sequence, and
organization test in Whelan could thus overprotect works such that
copyright protection would extend to unprotectable ideas
underlying a work.
The debate over the scope of protection to be afforded the nonliteral elements of computer programs illustrates the intertwined
nature of idea and expression in utilitarian works. The Altai court
clearly noted the problem specifically inherent to computer
programs:
[A] computer program is made up of sub-programs
and sub-sub-programs, and so on. Each of those
programs and sub-programs has at least one idea.
Some of them could be separately copyrightable;
but many of them are so standard or routine in the
computer field as to be almost automatic statements
or instructions written into a program.166
The Altai court attributed the difficulty in deciding the scope of
protection to the same abstraction problem that Judge Learned
Hand noted in the Nichols case.
Thus, one of the principle roles of the idea-expression doctrine
is to police the line between the protected expression and
unprotected utility that inherently exists when the Copyright Act
protects computer programs. Moreover, whether and to what
extent a computer program is protected by the Copyright Act
directly depends on how the line between idea and expression is
drawn.

165

Altai, 775 F. Supp. at 559 (quoting 3 NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 13.03[F][1]).
Id. at 559. The Altai court further noted a distinction between text and behavior.
Quoting the testimony of an expert witness, the Altai court noted that “there is no
necessary relationship between the sequence of operations in a program, which are part of
behavior, and the order or sequence in which those operations are set forth in the text of
the program—the source code and object code . . . . [T]he order in which sub-routines
appear in the program text is utterly irrelevant, and the two views of a computer program,
as text and as behavior, are quite distinct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166
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2. Conceptual Separability
The Copyright Act protects works of applied art. Yet, such
works embody both artistic expression and utilitarian function.
Federal courts have struggled with the task of determining to what
extent such works are protected under the Copyright Act. In doing
so, courts have attempted to separate the expressive elements of
utilitarian art from the utilitarian elements in accord with the
definition of a “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural work[]” under §
101 of the Copyright Act.167
The current version of the statute codifies the holding in Mazer
v. Stein.168 That Court confronted a work that was both a statue
and a table lamp.169 The Court noted that “[w]e find nothing in the
copyright statute to support the argument that the intended use or
use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or
invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limitation into
the copyright law.”170 The Supreme Court thus allowed the
protection of works that are at once utilitarian and expressive.
With the idea-expression dichotomy still in place, the
fundamental challenge in endorsing the holding in Mazer is
167
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the
design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).
168
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The house report notes that the bill affirms the
ruling in Mazer. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 105 (1976); see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v.
Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987); Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1980); Davis v. United Artists,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 726 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Beth F. Dumas, The Functionality
Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement Actions: A Call for Clarification,
12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 471, 473 n.17 (1990) (After the Supreme Court’s
decision in Mazer v. Stein, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1979) codified the holding, and it can
be argued that the statute adopts the regulation’s rule. The provision promulgated the
following rule—(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if
the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving,
or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing
independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.”)
169
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202–03.
170
Id. at 218.
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protecting the expressive component of such works while leaving
the underlying utility to the public domain or to the law of patents.
The standard to be used when policing the line between utility and
art has given rise to a broader debate over whether a work is
“conceptually separable.”171
The principle case giving rise to the distinction between works
of art that are and are not conceptually separable is the Second
Circuit opinion in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,172
in which that court determined whether decorative belt buckles
were copyrightable subject matter.173 Noting that the buckles
possessed ornamental elements that are conceptually separable
from the utilitarian function of the belt,174 the Second Circuit
particularly cited the use of the buckles on other parts of the body
besides the waist.175 The court then compared such a product to
jewelry,176 which at the time had been protected under copyright
law.177 In protecting the belt buckles by denying summary
judgment on the copyrightability issue, the Kieselstein-Cord court
endorsed a rule that interpreted the Copyright Act’s protections to
“extend only to ornamental or superfluous designs contained
within useful objects while denying [such protections] to
artistically designed functional components of useful objects.”178

171

The House Report to the 1976 Act notes that separability can be either physical or
conceptual. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976); Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993
(noting that the legislative history allows either physical or conceptual seperability as a
condition for protection).
172
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 989.
173
Id. at 990–91.
174
Id. at 993.
175
Id. (“We see in appellant’s belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements,
as apparently have the buckles’ wearers who have used them as ornamentation for parts
of the body other than the waist.”).
176
Id.
177
The Kieselstein-Cord court cited three cases for this proposition: Boucher v. Du
Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that costume jewelry, particularly
earrings were within the subject of the statute); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert Zentall,
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 510, 511–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (protecting a pendent rendering a tshirt); and Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 552–53
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (protecting what plaintiff in that case characterized as “junk jewelry,” or
costume jewelry).
178
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 996.
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The decision to protect works that are conceptually or
physically separable has given rise to several fragmented tests.
One such test emerged when the Second Circuit revisited its
holding in Kieselstein-Cord in 1985 in the case of Carol Barnhart
Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.179 Instead of overruling the decision,
that court distinguished the case on the grounds that the ornamental
components of the torso mannequins in that case were necessary to
the utility of the work.180 The Carol Barnhart court observed that
the ornamental elements of the torso mannequins were
“inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of
clothes.”181
Judge Newman, dissenting in Carol-Barnhart, articulated
another test for conceptual separability that inquired whether “the
article . . . stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is
separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.”182
Commentators have referred to this test as the “temporal
displacement” test.183
Yet another test emerged from Professor Robert C. Denicola’s
famous article,184 which attempted to create a clearer test for
conceptual separability.185 In seeking a workable rule, Professor
Denicola made an important concession about the endeavor and
noted that “[i]n truth, of course, there is no line, but merely a
spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees to
utilitarian concerns.”186 Setting criteria for a more ideal test,
179

773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 419.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
183
See WILLIAM PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 43–45 (6th ed. 1986); Eric
Setliff, Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 58 (2006); see also John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright Line
Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual
Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 313 (2005); Dana
Beldiman, Protecting The Form But Not The Function: Is U.S. Law Ready For A New
Model?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 545 (2004); Richard G.
Frenkel, Intellectual Property In The Balance: Proposals For Improving Industrial
Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531, 549 (1999).
184
Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983).
185
Id. at 741.
186
Id.
180
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Professor Denicola noted that “[o]nly a model appealing directly to
the considerations underlying the separability standard can avoid
purely arbitrary distinctions.”187
The Second Circuit, in the 1987 of Brandir International, Inc.,
v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,188 restated Professor Denicola’s
test as requiring that when “design elements reflect a merger of
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be
identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment exercised
independently of functional influences, conceptual separability
exists.”189
The several tests that have emerged to determine the issue of
conceptual separability illustrate the difficulty in policing the line
between utilitarian function and artistic expression.
By
maintaining a distinction between a work’s utilitarian function and
its artistic elements, courts ensure that authors cannot protect
utility under the guise of copyright, and in turn circumvent the
thorough examination process required to obtain patent
187

Id.
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
189
Id. at 1145. The Brandir court noted that the Denicola test had several benefits:
First, the approach is consistent with the holdings of our previous
cases. In Kieselstein-Cord, for example, the artistic aspects of the
belt buckles reflected purely aesthetic choices, independent of the
buckles’ function, while in Carol Barnhart the distinctive features
of the torsos—the accurate anatomical design and the sculpted shirts
and collars—showed clearly the influence of functional concerns.
Though the torsos bore artistic features, it was evident that the
designer incorporated those features to further the usefulness of the
torsos as mannequins. Second, the test’s emphasis on the influence
of utilitarian concerns in the design process may help, as Denicola
notes, to alleviate the de facto discrimination against
nonrepresentational art that has regrettably accompanied much of
the current analysis. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we
think Denicola’s test will not be too difficult to administer in
practice. The work itself will continue to give mute testimony of its
origins. In addition, the parties will be required to present evidence
relating to the design process and the nature of the work, with the
trier of fact making the determination whether the aesthetic design
elements are significantly influenced by functional considerations.
Id. at 1145–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188
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protection.190 This analytical process may not be required if the
idea-expression dichotomy is not a constitutional restraint on
copyright-like protection, this in turn will allow authors to
undermine the patent laws by taking advantage of legislation
passed under a different constitutionally enumerated power.

3. Contracting Protection When Idea and Expression Merge
The expression of a complex idea may take infinitely distinct
shapes, yet the expression of a simple idea can often easily be
enumerated and finite. Protecting the few ways to express an idea
would essentially create a monopoly in the idea in favor of
whoever copyrights every permutation of the idea’s expression
first.191 For example, protecting the phrase “have a nice day” may
preclude another author from using the phrase “have a good day.”
More clever individuals can simply seek protection of both phrases
and monopolize the idea underlying the salutation.
The idea-expression doctrine has given rise to a corollary
doctrine called the “merger doctrine.”192 This doctrine ensures that
when idea and expression merge neither can be expansively
protected under copyright.193 At the base of the doctrine is the
assumption that copyright protection in such cases would allow
monopolization of ideas without having to undergo patent
examination,194 and when the work is not patentable, the doctrine
prevents the impermissible protection of ideas.195
190

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954) (noting the plaintiff’s argument that
protecting the utilitarian work, in that case the table lamp, would undermine the extensive
patent examination process and prevent the monopolization of the utility of the work).
191
See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(“The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance
between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws. What is
basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner’s monopoly—from how large an
area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?”).
192
See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (describing
idea-expression and merger as close cousins).
193
See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th
Cir. 1990) (“The doctrine holds that when the expression of an idea is inseparable from
the idea itself, the expression and idea merge.”).
194
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (“When the idea and its expression are thus inseparable,
copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in such
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The doctrine has been applied to myriad cases, including
notable cases involving jewelry,196 computer software,197 sports
statistics,198 maps,199 and sweepstakes rules.200 The constant
among all of these cases is that the protection of expression is
tantamount to protecting ideas. For example, in Southco, Inc. v.
Kanebridge Corp.,201 the Third Circuit considered whether a
numbering system developed to identify and market screws can be
protected under the Copyright Act.202 A series of numbers were
used to encode the attributes of a particular screw.203 For instance,
circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the
conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
195
See CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir.
1994) (“It is also well established that, in order to protect the immunity of ideas from
private ownership, when the expression is essential to the statement of the idea, the
expression also will be unprotected, so as to insure free public access to the discussion of
the idea.”); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The
fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea and not the idea itself
is protectable has produced a corollary maxim that even expression is not protected in
those instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea that
protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.”)
(citations omitted); Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“When the idea and the expression of the idea coincide, then the expression will not be
protected in order to prevent creation of a monopoly on the underlying art.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
196
See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d
Cir. 1974) (jewel encrusted turtle pin); Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 738 (jewel encrusted bee
pin); Behnam Jewelry Corp. v. Aron Basha Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1078, 1093
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (baby shoe pendant).
197
See Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir.
1983) (rejecting the application of the doctrine to operating system attributes that
prevented the cloning of Apple computers).
198
See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 700.
199
See, e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463
(5th Cir. 1990) (applying the doctrine to a map indicating the location of a pipeline).
200
See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967) (applying
the doctrine to contest rules and finding that the rules were so simple that idea and
expression had merged).
201
390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
202
Id. at 277–78.
203
Id. (“Southco has referred to one of the numbers at issue in this case, part number 4710-202-10, to show how the system works. The first two digits (47) show that the part
falls within a class of captive screws. Other digits indicate characteristics such as thread
size (632), composition of the screw (aluminum), and finish of the knob (knurled).”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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the first two digits could indicate the thread size of the screw.204
The nine digit number in that case had 109 different
permutations.205
Yet only a small subset of the possible
combinations would have made any sense to a contractor choosing
a screw.206 The sequence could thus be viewed as a series of
numbers or a method of encoding.207 The court chose not to
protect the sequence of numbers.208 The result of doing otherwise
is readily apparent. Protecting the sequence as a sequence of
integers would allow individuals to register all 109 permutations, or
more feasibly, the subset of valid permutations. If, however, the
court decided that the sequence was protected as a method of
encoding, it would have protected a method of operation, which
copyright law is bound not to protect.209
The facts of the Southco case illustrate two principle functions
of the merger doctrine. First, the doctrine applies to short works
expressing simpler ideas and precludes the monopolization of idea
through the protection of expression. Although the court in
Southco did not rest its decision on merger grounds, the doctrine
prevented the numbering system from being monopolized by
simply copyrighting every valid permutation of the nine-digit
204

Id.
This number is the product of the number of possible numbers that can occupy each
of the available spaces in the sequence. In this case there are ten different digits that can
occupy each of the nine spaces.
206
This is because the method of encoding imposes some constraints on what can
constitute a valid sequence of numbers. To be sure, Southco probably doesn’t
manufacture a 1 m screw with 1 mm thread. If Southco makes only twenty types of
screws, only twenty of the number sequences can be valid.
207
Southco, 390 F.3d at 289–90 (“Put differently, the problem in this case is whether the
Southco part numbers are words, short phrases, names or titles, or whether they are
instead a compilation of data, a system of classification, or something else. Indeed, the
part numbers seem to fall into the gray area between a short phrase and a more extensive
work.”).
208
Id. at 287.
209
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). The Eighth Circuit confronted a part numbering
system similar to the one in Southco and held that the merger doctrine was inapplicable.
See Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We do not
believe that the idea of a parts numbering system is susceptible of only a very limited
number of expressions. Such systems will vary in complexity and composition as the
type of information attempted to be encoded into the designation and the method of
encoding varies. Granting a particular company a copyright in its own system or systems
would not necessarily monopolize the idea of a parts numbering system.”).
205
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sequence. Second, the doctrine ensures that seeking protection of
the expression cannot protect methods of encoding for which short
expression is often shorthand. Serial numbers, for example, often
encode information about the product. The sequence of numbers
may embody an unsophisticated encoding scheme—such as a
numbering of produced products—or the sequence may embody a
more complex system like the screws in Southco. Both systems,
however, are prevented from receiving expansive protection by
virtue of the merger doctrine.
The merger doctrine thus assists in maintaining the amorphous
line between idea and expression. Absent the existence of this
doctrine, short phrases could be removed from the public lexicon
and methods of encoding could be protected without going to the
trouble of seeking patent protection. The merger doctrine is thus a
necessary corollary of maintaining a distinction between idea and
expression.

4. The Doctrine of Fair Use: Policing the Boundaries of Idea
and Expression
A complementary doctrine to the idea-expression doctrine is
the doctrine of fair use, which congress codified in § 107 of the
Copyright Act.210 That provision provides that “[n]otwithstanding
the provisions of sections 106 . . . the fair use of a copyrighted
work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”211
The fair use defense can be characterized as both an affirmative
defense and as an exception to the statutory property right created
by federal copyright law.
When considering whether a use is fair, courts consider the
four non-exclusive212 statutory factors:
210

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Id.
212
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls
for case-by-case analysis.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576,
211
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(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.213
The ultimate goal of weighing the Fair Use factors is to
determine whether subordinating the copyright holder’s interests
would serve the purposes of copyright.214
Much of the judicial doctrine of Fair Use is justified by the
same need to subordinate the copyright to the broader policy
directive of “promoting the useful arts and sciences.”215 The
doctrine has also been used as a means of policing the boundaries
between idea and expression in works that straddle the line
between utilitarian and expressive.216 The Federal Circuit noted
588–89 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The Copyright Act itself lists four non-exclusive factors—I
emphasize non-exclusive—to consider in this inquiry.”); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
236–37 (1990) (“Congress provided examples of fair use . . . and listed four nonexclusive factors that a court must consider in determining whether an unauthorized use
is not infringing….”); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting
that the factors are non-exclusive).
213
17 U.S.C. § 107.
214
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (citation omitted) (“All [factors] are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”).
215
See id. at 575 n.5 (“The exclusion of facts and ideas from copyright protection serves
that goal as well.” (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359
(1991)))); Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.
1977) (“The fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a
copyright holder with the public’s interest in dissemination of information affecting areas
of universal concern, such as art, science and industry.”); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[C]opyright protection is designed ‘To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ and the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright
holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself.”); see also
Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: “Fair Use” Looks Different on
Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (1980) [hereinafater “Note, Universal City
Studios”] (“Fair use applies where the exclusivity of an author’s rights would retard,
rather than promote, the progress of art, science, and history.”).
216
See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 644 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“AT would lose this copyright case even if the raw data were so entangled
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this function of Fair Use in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America Inc.,217 in stating that:
The fair use reproductions of a computer program
must not exceed what is necessary to understand the
unprotected elements of the work. This limited
exception is not an invitation to misappropriate
protectable expression. Any reproduction of
protectable expression must be strictly necessary to
ascertain the bounds of protected information within
the work.218
The Atari court noted that fair use played a vital role in
balancing the rights of the copyright holder with public interest in
building on pre-existing ideas.219 The fair use defense thus
prevents authors from claiming a property interest that is so
expansive that the ultimate objectives of the copyright act are
undermined.220

with Market Drive that they could not be extracted without making a copy of the
program.”); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“Enforcement of a total ban on reverse engineering would conflict with the Copyright
Act itself by protecting otherwise unprotectable material.”); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc.
v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The unprotected ideas and
functions of the code therefore are frequently undiscoverable in the absence of
investigation and translation that may require copying the copyrighted material. We
conclude that, under the facts of this case and our precedent, Connectix’s intermediate
copying and use of Sony’s copyrighted BIOS was a fair use for the purpose of gaining
access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s software.”); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The need to disassemble object code arises, if at
all, only in connection with operations systems, system interface procedures, and other
programs that are not visible to the user when operating—and then only when no
alternative means of gaining an understanding of those ideas and functional concepts
exists. In our view, consideration of the unique nature of computer object code thus is
more appropriate as part of the case-by-case, equitable ‘fair use’ analysis authorized by
section 107 of the Act.”).
217
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
218
Id. at 843.
219
See id. at 842 (“The Copyright Act thus balances ‘the interests of authors . . . in the
control and exploitation of their writings . . . on the one hand, and society’s competing
interests in the free flow of ideas, [and] information . . . on the other hand.’” (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1984)))
(omissions and alterations in original).
220
See id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50).
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Moreover, the factors themselves specifically enforce the
distinction between idea and expression. The first factor, for
example, inquires into the purpose and character of the use largely
to determine whether the use is an attempt to ascertain what parts
of the work are unprotected ideas rather than a naked attempt to
profit from misappropriation.221 This distinction has been labeled
as one between commercial and productive use.222 The difficulty
is that profit-motive is not always mutually exclusive with other
more benign uses.223
Courts applying the first factor have therefore instead focused
on the direct interplay between the doctrine and the constitutional
mandate to promote the useful arts and sciences by determining

221

See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
(“The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor
that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use. ‘[E]very commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
the owner of the copyright.’” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 451)); Pac. & S.
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984) (“This commercial nature of the use
militates quite strongly against a finding of fair use . . . .”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Handgun
Control Fed’n, 844 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (“What is necessary is a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future
harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed.
But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”); Ass’n
of Am. Med. Colls. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (D. Pa. 1983) (“[A] court should
not strain to apply the fair use defense when it is being invoked by a profit-making
defendant that has made extensive verbatim use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
materials.”).
222
See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981),
reversed, Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417 (“Despite the nebulous character of the
doctrine, previous case law and the general copyright scheme do provide us with
considerable guidance. As the first sentence of [§] 107 indicates, fair use has
traditionally involved what might be termed the ‘productive use’ of copyrighted
material.”). The Ninth Circuit in that case seemed to derive the term from commentary
classifying certain types of uses as “productive uses,” in that such uses “incorporate[ ] the
copyrighted material in a developmental process, that is, in creating a second work or
carrying on research or education.” Note, Universal City Studios, supra note 215, at
1013.
223
See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In
fact, publishers of educational textbooks are as profit-motivated as publishers of scandalmongering tabloid newspapers. And a serious scholar should not be despised and denied
the law’s protection because he hopes to earn a living through his scholarship. The
protection of the statute should not turn on sackcloth and missionary zeal. It rather
directs the court to make an appraisal of social usefulness and of commercial fair play.”).
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whether the new work is “transformative.”224 The Supreme Court
has reasoned that transformative uses weigh in favor of fair use
because “the goal of copyright . . . is generally furthered by the
creation of transformative works.”225 By determining whether a
work is transformative a court in turn determines whether such a
fair use furthers the broader policy objectives of allowing the
public to build on ideas226 or facts,227 precisely the same objective
sought through the application of the idea-expression doctrine.
Likewise, when applying the second factor courts have turned
to the nature of the work, expanding copyright protection when the
work is creative and contracting protection when the work is
factual or utilitarian.228 In sum, the second factor safeguards
against the monopolization of facts, utility, and ideas under the
guise of copyright protection. Fair Use can therefore be viewed as
complimentary to the idea-expression doctrine, safeguarding
224

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“The
central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’”) (citations omitted).
225
Id.
226
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
227
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (“Facts, whether
alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be
copyrighted.”).
228
See Diamond v. Am-Law Pub. Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d. Cir. 1981) (“The work in question was avowedly
informational, and such works may be more freely published under Section 107 than
those of a creative nature.”); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,
972 (9th Cir. 1981) (“If a work is more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is
less likely that a claim of fair use will be accepted.”); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Whether the privilege may justifiably be
applied to particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g., whether
their distribution would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information
and whether their preparation requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same
subject matter. Consequently, the privilege has been applied to works in the fields of
science, law, medicine, history and biography.”); Monster Commc’ns v. Turner Broad.
Sys., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)) (“The second of the factors, the nature
of the copyrighted work, focuses on the degree of creativity of the copyrighted work.
‘[T]he more creative a work, the more protection it should be accorded from copying.’”)
(alteration in original).
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against the rigid application of the copyright laws to the detriment
of the public interest.229
IV. IDEA-EXPRESSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The distinction between idea and expression is largely a
judicial and statutory construct.230 Yet, the Constitution on its face
makes a distinction between “science and useful arts.”231 This
distinction can be interpreted as distinguishing between utilitarian
works and the expression of knowledge. Utilitarian works are
often intertwined with the ideas giving rise to their design,232 yet

229

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The doctrine of fair use, originally created
and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster.”).
230
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); accord Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879)
(holding that the accounting process underlying accounting forms was not within the
subject matter of copyright).
231
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
232
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful
article’.”); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f an
article has any intrinsic utilitarian function, it can be denied copyright protection except
to the extent that its artistic features can be identified separately and are capable of
existing independently as a work of art.”); Custom Chrome Inc. v. Ringer, 35 U.S.P.Q.2D
(BNA) 1714, 1716 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that copyright protects utilitarian works to the
extent that they are conceptually separable from protectable expression). The difficulty
in protecting non-literal elements of computer programs reflects the intertwining of idea
and expression in utilitarian works. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys.,
Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the non-literal elements of code can
be protected to the extent that the work embodies expression rather than ideas); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that the structure, sequence, and organization of code can be protected under copyright).
“Courts, however, have struggled to define what other elements of a computer program,
literal and/or non-literal, to which a computer program’s copyright protection extends.”
Digital Commc’ns Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (D.
Ga. 1987); see also Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir.
1992) (“While, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in which a programmer
may effectuate certain functions within a program,—i.e., express the idea embodied in a
given subroutine—efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of choice as to
make only one or two forms of expression workable options.”).
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the sciences, or the expression of knowledge, while embodying
ideas, can be reformulated and expressed in different terms.233
Commentators, however, have concluded that the phrase “must
be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the
purpose of the power but not in limitation of its exercise.”234
Although the phrase can be interpreted as part of an aspiration
preamble,235 it is clear that the distinction could not have been
meaningless, or else a simple and broad constitutional mandate to

233

See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand,
J.) (“[T]he right cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by
immaterial variations”). Later in this decision Judge Hand further delves into the notion
that ideas can be restated in different ways with the following example:
[W]e do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely
enough for infringement. How far that correspondence must go is
another matter. Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to
the characters, quite independently of the “plot” proper, though, as
far as we know, such a case has never arisen.
Id. Judge Hand goes on to state the proposition that the same plot can be restated in
different ways by using Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night as an example. Judge Hand opined
that
[i]f Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second
comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to
infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he
cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his
mistress.
Id.
234
1 NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 103 [A] (citations omitted).
235
The provision can be interpreted as conflating the vesting of private with a broader
public benefit. James Madison commented on the clause noting that “[t]he utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law . . . . The public good fully
coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately
make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
43 (James Madison) (emphasis added). The national character of the rights afforded
under the copyright clause reinforce the premise that protecting intellectual property
rights uniformly is in direct accord with the interests of the several states. See Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (“The interests of a State which grants copyright
protection may, however, be adversely affected by other States that do not; individuals
who wish to purchase a copy of a work protected in their own State will be able to buy
unauthorized copies in other States where no protection exists.”).
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protect works would have done just as well.236 The distinction can
serve as the basis for a constitutional requirement that the task of
protecting ideas and expression are distinct undertakings.
This section will argue that the distinction between idea and
expression is a constitutional requirement rather than a judicial
division of labor between the copyright and patent laws. The
constitutional nature of the doctrine is particularly relevant when
federal law affords copyright-like protection under an alternative
constitutional grant of power such as the Commerce Clause or
Treaty Power.
This section will interpret Article I, Section 8 Clause 8 of the
Constitution to embody the dichotomy between idea and
expression. This section will further argue that if the doctrine is a
constitutional requirement such requirement must sometimes
constrain an exercise of congressional power under an alternative
constitutional grant or else authors could protect their works
without the constraints of the doctrine and potentially monopolize
both the expression of ideas and the underlying ideas themselves.
As the analytical corollaries of the idea-expression doctrine
indicate, the idea-expression doctrine has five indispensable
purposes:
1. the doctrine ensures that the protection of ideas remain
within the province of patent law and are subject to
rigorous patent examination;
2. the doctrine ensures that the public domain can
continue to use necessary elements of expression, such
as numbers, short pairings of words, or combinations of
letters;

236

The qualifying phrase explains why certain works should be protected. Without a
direct indication that the protection was to serve the public interest, many of the
balancing features of copyright, such as the idea-expression doctrine, the doctrine of
merger, and the defense of fair use could not have evolved because protecting the
underlying ideas and facts of a work would not be a priority. See Wainwright Securities
Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The doctrine offers a
means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with the public’s interest in
dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, science,
history, or industry.”); see also infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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3. the doctrine carefully facilitates non-literal protection of
computer software without conferring patent-like
protection on computer programs;
4. the doctrine minimizes the impact of copyright
protection on First Amendment rights; and
5. the doctrine ensures that individuals can determine the
metes and bounds of naturally amorphous intellectual
property rights.
The functional purposes of the idea-expression doctrine
support the constitutional mandate at the heart of the Copyright
Clause. Promoting the progress of the useful arts and sciences
means, among other things, ensuring that a property right is well
defined and discretely protected. It also means that any property
rights given to products of the mind are carefully balanced with
other fundamental constitutional rights. To be sure, an intellectual
property right that creates a property right at the expense of the
First Amendment right would defeat the very principle underlying
the Constitution’s authorization to protect intellectual property.
If one considers the protection of intellectual property as a
bargain between the government and the author,237 the property
right must come at the expense of the public being able to build on
the ideas of the work and to eventually build on the expressive
elements.238 The Copyright Clause demands a practical balancing
of interests.239 This pragmatic balancing requires the consideration
of functional problems. Many of the functional problems have
been solved by copyright law’s rich doctrine.
Protecting
expressive works absent the tradition of doctrines that have
developed over the years may undermine the delicate balance of
interests achieved by the Copyright Act.
Yet for such doctrines to apply they must be elevated to
constitutional stature, or else they will not impose any constraints
237
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
238
See id.
239
See Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 94.
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on other exercises of constitutional power. This section will argue
that the idea-expression doctrine is a constitutional doctrine. The
idea-expression doctrine has solved many of the pragmatic
problems that arise when protecting expression to a different
degree than ideas. A third category of protection that does not
make the distinction between idea and expression could threaten
the divide between patent and copyright law.
Many of the arguments for a constitutionally required ideaexpression doctrine are pragmatic. The doctrine would facilitate
the asymmetric examination and registration requirements of
existing patent and copyright laws.240 The doctrine would better
define the property right being given to an author, and alleviate
vagueness and lack of notice issues when criminal sanctions are
imposed for misappropriating of works subject to amorphous
delineation. Moreover, while existing copyright and patent laws
may successfully promote the useful arts and sciences, a third class
of protections that are accompanied by criminal sanctions may
chill the creation of derivative works, undermining the Copyright
Clause’s policy of promoting the useful arts and sciences.
Functional reasons alone do not warrant interpreting the
Copyright Clause to embody an idea-expression dichotomy. The
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution can be interpreted
to mandate a difference in protection between idea and expression.
This section will also propose a textual argument to support such a
distinction and in turn support a constitutional idea-expression
doctrine.
A. Maintaining the Division Between Patent and Copyright Law
Protecting intellectual property rights similar to those governed
by the copyright and patent laws would undermine the divisions
between copyright and patent. Copyright law does not require that
an invention be novel, instead it requires only originality.241 That

240

See infra note 245–247 and accompanying text.
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”);
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although
241
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is, authors that independently produce the same work without
access to each other’s works would not be liable for
infringement.242 Patents, on the other hand, condition the property
right on the invention being new and non-obvious.243 Only the
first of two independent inventors would receive the property right,
regardless of access considerations.244 One inventor would be an
innovator in the eyes of the law and the other an infringer.
These differences have given rise to very different examination
processes and protections. Patents are subject to rigorous
examination; copyrights are not.245 To enforce this distinction,
either patent law cannot protect the same subject matter as
copyright law,246 or the works must provide different protections
that are in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining the property

novelty, uniqueness and ingenuity are not required, independent creation is.” (citing L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d. Cir. 1976))).
242
See Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Independent
creation, on the other hand, can rebut a presumption of copying after the copyright
plaintiff establishes access and substantial similarity.” (citing Taylor Corp. v. Four
Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005))); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f independent creation results in an
identical work, the creator of that work is free to sell it.”(citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d
896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984))).
243
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2000) amended by 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (Supp. II 2002).
244
See Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286, 302 (1894) (“If Steward
were in fact the first to invent the pivotal extension to a butt adjuster, he is entitled to a
patent therefor.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1262 (Fed. Cir.
2002)) (“[A] party that does not have the earliest effective filing date needs only to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it was the first to invent if the two
patents or applications at issue were co-pending before the PTO.”).
245
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 (1954) (“[D]esign patents require the critical
examination given patents to protect the public against monopoly.”); Stein v. Expert
Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611, 612–13 (7th Cir. 1951) (“Congress has provided two separate
and distinct classes or fields of protection, the copyright and the patent. . . . The
Copyright Office makes no examination or search as to the originality or novelty of the
claimed ‘work of art.’ Applications for design patents are . . . subject to an examination
in which the examiner searches through all available publications, prior patents and all
prior art available, to determine if the design possesses the qualities requisite to granting
a design patent.”).
246
The idea-expression doctrine ensures that overlaps between patentable and
copyrightable subject matter are resolved. The doctrine serves a sorting purpose,
preventing idea-intertwined works from gaining protection without being subject to
rigorous patent examination.
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right.247 Regardless of how such a division occurs, such a division
is necessary to facilitate divergent doctrines.
One can easily conceive of a statute conferring protection on
works that could receive either patent or copyright protection but
that either vests more rights than copyright or less rights than
patent. Or the statute could require more lax examination than
patents yet protect the idea underlying the work just the same.
Such a statute would provide an incentive not to use existing patent
laws as a means of protecting works when more lax examination
will yield equivalent protection of the underlying ideas of the
work.248 A similar incentive might exist not to seek copyright
protection because a copyright-like work could receive a patentlike monopoly under a different statute with more lax examination
requirements than patents.249
Another possible complication may arise if one can seek
overlapping protections of the work.250 A copyright could receive
protection under the copyright laws and receive even more
protections under a third criminal statute. The addition of further
sanctions for misappropriation of a copyright would bolster the
strength of the copyright and tip the delicate balance between

247

Patents are protected for twenty years and bestow a complete monopoly in the
underlying ideas of an invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date
on which the application for the patent was filed . . .”). Copyrights protect the work for a
longer duration, typically the author’s life plus seventy years, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), but
the property right is substantially weaker. Cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that copyrights create less market
power than patents).
248
Cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“It is no accident that patent protection has preconditions that
copyright protection does not—notably, the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness—and that patents are granted for a shorter period than copyrights.”).
249
The anti-bootlegging statute in Moghadam is an excellent example. The statute
imposed a bar on misappropriating live performances without the requirements of
fixation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273–75 (11th Cir. 1999).
250
Although overlaps between patent and copyright protection already occur, the ideaexpression doctrine has mediated between doctrines to retain the delicate balance implicit
in each statutory scheme. A third form of protection that is unconstrained by such a
mediating mechanism may destroy the balance struck between protection and innovation
in both patent and copyright statutory schemes.
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protection and public benefit.251 A copyright scheme that receives
reinforcements from alternative commerce statutes would make it
difficult to determine, a priori, where the line between private
monopoly and public domain falls.252
B. Indeterminate Delineation of Property, Transactional
Certainty, and Due Process Rights
The idea-expression doctrine facilitates a more concise
definition of the property rights granted by the Copyright Act.
Without the doctrine the property right being conferred by an
alternate statute may be difficult to delineate and in turn protect.
One of the most fundamental protections afforded property are
rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.253 Procedural Due Process protects the deprivation
of property from arbitrary government conduct by imposing
procedural constraints.254 It becomes difficult to determine when
such procedural requirements must be afforded an owner of
intellectual property.255

251
See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(“The guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance
between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws. What is
basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner’s monopoly—from how large an
area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?”).
252
The Fair Use Doctrine has been criticized for possessing the same deficiency. The
indeterminate nature of the four factors makes it difficult to predict where the line
between liability and fair use lies. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion And Rights Accretion
In Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 889 (2007) (“The case law has been
particularly unhelpful. The Supreme Court’s first incursions into fair use immediately
struck a chord that still resonates in the jurisprudence: the doctrine’s equitable, factspecific, and thus indeterminate nature. Those who were hoping for hard and fast rules
were out of luck, and have remained so since. From the ex post perspective of the
defendant already embroiled in expensive litigation, an adaptable, equitable defense is
useful. But for the prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will prove to be
infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante guidance.”).
253
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST amend. V.
254
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are
meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”).
255
Cf. Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1021 (1st Cir.
1989) (noting that the due process rights depend on how property is defined).
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It also becomes difficult to determine what Due Process rights
a potential infringer that independently creates the same work will
be afforded. The Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is established
that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to the conduct it prohibits.”256 Without idea-expression it
becomes difficult for the law to determine whether someone is a
pirate or a resourceful innovator, whether the law encourages his
behavior or can deprive him of the fruits of his intellectual labor.
This problem of defining the boundaries of one’s rights will
always be a side effect of protecting intangible rights. Courts must
decide the scope of the intangible rights the Copyright Act affords
individuals. Courts face the same issue when protecting intangible
substantive Due Process rights, or in preventing statutes grounded
in animus under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. It
is clear that the scope of intangible rights is a judicially
manageable issue.
However, the idea-expression doctrine mitigates much of the
indeterminacy inherent in the process of delineating such rights by
ensuring that certain elements of a work—its ideas—are certainly
not included in the bundle of rights afforded under federal
copyright law. The goal of doctrinal stability is to facilitate certain
forms of private conduct, not necessarily to ensure that post hoc
judicial determinations can be made. Certainty in standards of
conduct provides clear notice to individuals, thus increasing the
probability that private parties will transact. With intellectual
property rights, such as copyrights, which depend on the use of
ideas and prior expression, transactional certainty will ensure that
private parties will not have to factor the risk of erroneous
deprivation into their transactions.
C. Amorphously Defined Property Rights and Criminal Liability
The anti-bootlegging statute in United States v. Moghadam
imposed criminal sanctions of five to ten years in prison for an
unauthorized fixation of a live performance.257 Yet unlike a statute
256
257

Giaccio v. Pa., 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006).
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punishing the violation of another’s rights to tangible property, the
rights being protected by such a criminal statute are not as well
defined. Questions of what constitutes a live performance or an
unauthorized fixation loom beneath the seemingly clear text.
Intellectual property rights are defined by the law that gives rise to
their creation. Much of intellectual property body of doctrine can
be indeterminate absent judicial review. This uncertainty in turn
often chills the use of public domain ideas that might find
protection in the copyright laws.
Those seeking to use copyrighted works are often faced with
the prospect of facing civil liabilities should their estimations of
the scope of a work’s intellectual property rights prove incorrect.258
Criminal sanctions, however, would preclude infringers from even
attempting to assert a fair use defense. Thus, not only would
criminal sanctions eviscerate the fair use defense, but the overall
chilling effect on the production of new works is much greater.
Being faced with the improbable prospect of facing civil
damages for copyright infringement may make an undertaking
nevertheless worth it. One would simply multiply the probability
of being found liable for infringement by the amount of damages
one expects. Criminal sanctions, however, may never be worth the
risk. Individuals seeking to create works that may result in
criminal sanctions may be deterred from the undertaking
altogether.259 If such a statute is free of the constraints of the ideaexpression doctrine, individuals seeking to use what should be
public domain will not have the additional comfort of knowing that
certain portions of the work can never be part of the property right
and will certainly be chilled from using any part of the work.
At the core of the Intellectual Property Clause’s charge is to
promote the useful arts and sciences.260 An integral part of
promoting such works through property incentives is allowing the
258

Gibson, supra note 252, at 885.
This reasoning has been employed in the context of criminal laws that may chill First
Amendment expression. See U.S. v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1994)
(applying scienter requirement in a criminal statute to apply to both the sexually explicit
nature of a work and the age of the performers in sexually explicit film in order to avoid a
chilling effect on First Amendment expression).
260
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
259
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public an intellectual base to build on. Indeed, there are few ideas
that owe nothing to another’s work. Ideas fuel ideas. Absent the
flexibility to build on the works of others one cannot expect a
property rights incentive scheme such as the one contemplated by
the Constitution to work. If the property rights created under
alternate exercises of power are not bound by the doctrines
developed to define and delineate the scope of the property right
being awarded, then such laws are free to chill the creation of the
works that the copyright and patent laws intend to facilitate and
encourage.
D. A Textual Derivation of Idea-Expression
The idea-expression doctrine is implicit in the language of the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause. That clause states the
following “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”261 The phrase
“promote the progress of science and the useful arts” has been
interpreted as a mere preamble, stating the broad purpose of the
clause. Professor Nimmer notes that “this introductory phrase is in
the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself
constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must
be measured. Its effect at most is to suggest certain minimal
elements to be contained in copyright legislation.”262
The predominant interpretation of this phrase has been as
constitutional garnish of only aesthetic relevance. The phrase is,
however, far more than an explanation of the broader purposes of
the provision. It makes a distinction between types of works. By
defining the clause’s purpose in terms of what it protects, the
distinction between the useful arts and sciences implies that the
useful arts are not the sciences, and that the constitutional mandate
is to protect both. These two types of works are not equivalent or
else an encapsulating phrase could have been used. Beneath this
distinction is the idea-expression doctrine. Copyright is to protect
one form of work, while patents are to protect the other.
261
262

Id.
NIMMER, supra note 164, at § 1.03.
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A possible purpose behind this distinction is that the useful
arts, unlike the sciences may require content specific
determinations by the government. The determination of what is
or is not useful is a subject matter specific one. Separating the
works would allow one form of work to be regulated without
regard to subject matter, while another form of work could be
regulated after a thorough subject matter inquiry.
This interpretation is consistent with avoiding the evils of the
early interpretations of the clause, which contemplated content
controls on what could be protected under copyright law.263
Subject matter determinations led to the invalidation of copyrights
in obscene materials because they failed to promote the useful arts
and sciences.264 The inherent chilling effect of government subject
matter regulation led to a firm division between the subject matter
specific protections of patent law and the subject matter
independent protections of copyright law.265 This division could
have been what was intended in the distinction between the useful
arts and sciences in the Constitution. The distinction may have
been made to avoid subject matter regulation of literary and artistic
works, and in turn relieve the inherent tension between protecting
copyrightable works and rights afforded under the First
Amendment.

263

See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979) (“Congress could reasonably conclude that the best way to promote creativity is
not to impose any governmental restrictions on the subject matter of copyrightable works.
By making this choice Congress removes the chilling effect of governmental judgments
on potential authors and avoids the strong possibility that governmental officials
(including judges) will err in separating the useful from the non-useful.”).
264
See Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9173) (“Hence, it
expressly appears that congress is not empowered by the constitution to pass laws for the
protection or benefit of authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the
progress of ‘science and useful arts.’ For this reason, an invention expressly designed to
facilitate the commission of crime, as murder, burglary, forgery or counterfeiting,
however novel or ingenious, could not be patented. So with a dramatic composition
which is grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the morals of the people. The
exhibition of such a drama neither ‘promotes the progress of science or useful arts,’ but
the contrary.”).
265
See Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860.
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Applying the well-known canon of construction, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,266 would mean that the enumeration of
two types of works—useful arts and sciences—would imply the
exclusion of other types of works. Thus Congress can only protect
ideas and expression and it can only do so under the constraints of
the provision’s requirements. The division between types of works
is itself a constraint on congressional power. Under such an
interpretation, a distinction between the two types of works is
mandatory rather than permissive.
This distinction creates a wall of separation between the types
of works. If one protects ideas after thorough review, the other
must not if the review process is weaker. If one requires subject
matter constraints on the “useful arts” phrase, and the lack of such
constraints on the “sciences” phrase, the provision can be
interpreted as requiring that one form of work be regulated with
respect to permissible subject matter and the other be regulated
independent of subject matter. To maintain a division between
works that receive protection after thorough review of their subject
matter and protections that attach to works without subject matter
review requires that the weaker protection remain separate and
independent from the boundaries of the stronger. To be sure, a
copyright that protects ideas would allow an author to circumvent
the thorough patent review process. The intrusion, however,
would harm both intellectual property rights. Although the
copyright holder would receive patent like protection without
review of the work’s subject matters in most cases, a court may
sometimes review the subject matter that a copyright is predicated
on for novelty and non-obviousness, which is a small step away
from censorship. Judicial review of the subject matter of literary
works, for example, would retard rather than promote the progress
of the arts. One can conceive of a situation in which it would be
better to forgo the property right all together and avoid judicial
review of the novelty of one’s literary work.
Assuming a dichotomy of works such that some works can be
regulated based on subject matter and some works cannot, such an
266
The canon literally means that “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another.” See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006).
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interpretation would mean that regulating the protection of ideas
would have to be done with greater care than when regulating
expression. This is because an idea is the foundation of
expression. Regulating the subject matter of ideas that can be
protected will allow the government to ensure that monopolies will
not be given for ideas that are necessary for autonomy and
expression. The government must be free to limit the protection of
ideas to those in which the long-term benefit to society of
conferring a monopoly is worth the short-term restraints on their
proliferation. Regulating the subject matter of patents ensures that
ideas can be freely disseminated as expression under copyright.
The distinction facilitates the protection of both types of works.
The distinction between the useful arts and sciences is thus
more than a broad statement of the purpose of the Intellectual
Property Clause. It is instead a textual anchor for what has
judicially developed to become the modern idea-expression
doctrine. The doctrine is an axiom of copyright law and it can be
derived directly from the text of the Intellectual Property Clause.

V. A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF IDEA-EXPRESSION,
ALTERNATE CONGRESSIONAL POWERS, AND THE CANON OF
HORIZONTAL SUBORDINATION
If the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution mandates
an idea-expression dichotomy, then the fundamental question in
Martignon and Moghadam must be answered. Does the Copyright
Clause constrain the scope of the Commerce Clause? The
monopoly for ideas must be conferred cautiously,267 and the
subject matter of the monopoly must be carefully regulated in
order to facilitate the broad pool of ideas required to create
expressive works.268 If such a fundamental doctrine can be short267
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989)
(noting that the protection of intellectual property rights requires striking a delicate
balance between free exploitation and providing incentives to create); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting a similar balance).
268
See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“Because copyright law
ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative
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circuited and circumvented through an exercise of alternate
constitutional grants of power, the doctrine will lose force in the
conventional copyright and patent context.269
This section will consider the horizontal constraints created by
a constitutional idea-expression doctrine.270 In particular, this
section will consider the extent to which the constitutional ideaexpression doctrine constrains or qualifies the commerce power.
This section will propose a test to resolve the tension between
the narrow Intellectual Property Clause and the broad Commerce
Power. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to it as the
“Horizontal Subordination” test. Rather than a rigid rule requiring
the narrower clause to qualify the more general one, or a rule that
undermines narrower provisions by allowing what the broadest
constitutional provision allows, the Canon of Horizontal
Subordination ensures that the analysis is more flexible and will
ensure that Congress retains its power to legislate even amidst a
clash of constitutional grants of power.
A. The Nature of the Problem: Three Possibilities
Starting from the assumption that Article I, Section 8
implements a system of limited federal powers—enumerating
powers that the federal government could wield, and by
implication, denying powers not therein271—this initial assumption
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as
clearly as possible.”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50
(“To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”
(citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985))).
269
Why abide by the rules governing traditional patents and copyrights when one can
seek a property right under an alternative body of law with no such constraints? There
may be some reasons to stick with patents or seek a copyright. For example, a patent
may provide more protection for the underlying ideas than an alternative statute and a
copyright may be less costly to obtain. However, when the difference in protection and
cost between conventional intellectual property protections and an alternate body of law
become negligible, the incentive to circumvent the idea-expression doctrine becomes far
greater.
270
As used herein, “horizontal” means any constraints resulting from other Article I
provisions.
271
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 301 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(condoning the limited federal power assumption); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57–58
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means that each clause is an island. It can support only an exercise
of power within its scope. If the Intellectual Property Clause
allows the protection of works for limited times, then the
implication is that it cannot protect works for an indefinite period
of time.272 The Ninth and Tenth Amendments require that
whatever is not enumerated is reserved by either the states or the
people of the United States.273 Although the Tenth Amendment,
has proven an inert qualification of the Commerce Power,274 its
existence implies a general structure of circumscribed grants of
power. Absent the assumption that nothing other than what is
granted in the Constitution belongs to the federal government, the
Tenth Amendment would be far too dynamic a qualification of
federal power to justify its very existence.275 The reservation of
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce
Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything-and the Federal Government is no longer
one of limited and enumerated powers.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155,
(1992) (“‘[T[he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.’” (quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”).
272
Although it has been argued that the current term of copyright protection violates the
Limited Times provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has disagreed. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003). The Supreme Court has been quite
deferential when it comes to defining the scope of the intellectual property protections
under the Constitutional provision. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 (“[I]t is
Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly
that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product.”). It is hard to conceive of any term, as long as it is conceptually finite,
that would violate the provision.
273
See U.S. CONST. amend. IX–X.
274
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985)
(holding that the Tenth Amendment should not interpreted as barring the federal
government’s exercise of the Commerce Power when it impinges on functions
traditionally relegated to the states). The Garcia Court overruled National League of
Cities v. Usery, see id. at 47, which held exactly the opposite. See 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976) (“This exercise of congressional authority does not comport with the federal
system of government embodied in the Constitution. We hold that insofar as the
challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.”).
275
The Tenth Amendment can be viewed as no different than a mandatory canon of
interpretation. That is, the power expressly given to the states are not an exhaustive list.
In a more formal sense, the provision applies the exclusio alterius canon to federal
powers and not to state powers. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
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powers to the states implies a fixed subset of government powers
that are not at any given time granted to the federal government. If
the federal government can only exercise powers it is expressly
given then, there are other powers that the federal government does
not have. It follows from the Amendments that what was not
given to the federal government can be retained by the states or the
people.
The fundamental question is whether this assumption is
justified in all cases. There are three possible scenarios to
consider. First, when a more specific grant of constitutional power
is being used to justify the exercise of congressional power, and
such a grant of power would be forbidden under a more general
provision, the need for subordination should be at its minimum.
The intermediate case is when two provisions of equal scope both
reach the same exercise of congressional power. In such a case,
the assumption should be that the provisions should be alternate. If
one grant of power fails the other should be able to nevertheless
support congressional action.
Finally when a narrower
constitutional provision addresses a particular exercise of
congressional power, a broader power should only apply if doing
so would not eviscerate the narrower provision.
These three categories are not discrete. It is difficult to
compare the scope of some constitutional provisions, but in some
cases a provision might be subject matter specific while another is
a general grant of power. This indicates a difference in scope. For
example, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be considered a
general grant of congressional power because of its broad terms
and interpreted scope, whereas the Intellectual Property Clause is
far more circumscribed, addressing only the protection of
intellectual property rights. The very nature of the grants of power
differ from one another.
The Commerce Clause, like the § 5 power, is a general grant of
power. Both provisions however are considered broad because
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 561–62 (1994) (“The message
of the Tenth Amendment is that expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to lists of
governmental powers. All powers not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people. The amended text expressly
precludes the existence of unenumerated, or inherent, powers of government.”).
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they have been interpreted so expansively. The scope of such
power, which appears on its face to be subject matter specific,
depends on the interpretation it is given. The Commerce Power of
one hundred years ago is not the commerce power today. This is
precisely the problem with applying the Trademark Cases today.
Since the Commerce Power would not support the exercise of
congressional power in that case the court had no occasion to
decide whether the provision would qualify a narrower
constitutional provision. Similarly, comparing § 5’s scope after
the Slaughterhouse Cases276 with the Commerce Clause of today
would reveal a stark contrast between the scope of the two
provisions.
Thus two important factors determine, which of the three
scenarios are at issue. First, the express terms of the clause. Is it
on its face very subject matter specific, if so, how specific?
Second, the interpretive scope of the provisions must be compared.
Determining which category a specific case is in determines
whether the assumption that each provision qualifies the other
applied with full force.
The only time that balancing is necessary is when a broader
constitutional provision is being used to address an issue within the
scope of a narrower Constitutional provision. The assumption that
each Article I provision qualifies the other, creating discrete
islands of constitutional power is at its zenith. It is readily
apparent that the Commerce Clause, reaching everything from
trains to home-grown wheat, is far broader in its reach that the
Intellectual Property clause. Falling in the third category, the
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause must
be balanced against the purpose of the narrower Intellectual
Property Clause.
B. Fashioning a Test to Balance the Commerce and Intellectual
Property Clauses
The Commerce Clause is an Article I power just as the
Intellectual Property Clause is. The grant of Article I powers are
presented in a serial form, enumerating congressional powers one
276

83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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after the other.277 This would naturally imply that Article I powers
are implicitly related and can modify or qualify one another. The
truth of this proposition is what is essentially at issue in Martignon
and Moghadam.
The power to regulate commerce is far broader than the power
to regulate intellectual property rights. Congressional power to
regulate commerce must be weighed against Congress’ power to
protect intellectual property rights and one must be subordinated to
the other. There are two traditional ways to address this issue.
Either one must determine which one of these rights is most
important or one must simply choose the provision that is most
specifically targeted at the subject matter being regulated as the
supporting power. The latter method is the principle employed in
The former is the method employed in
Moghadam.278
279
Martignon.
The consequences of choosing between these two constructions
of the two Article I powers are significant. To hold the Commerce
Clause to be constrained by narrower Article I provisions would
imply that all narrower Article I powers similarly constraint the
commerce clause, substantially restricting congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. On the other hand, if the two clauses
are interpreted as separate and independent grants of power that do
not qualify each other, then the sole arbiter of congressional power
will be the broadest clause in Article I, the Commerce Clause.
Both interpretations can produce absurd results. Instead, a
subordination test that considers both the doctrine that would
qualify the alternative exercise of power and the nature of the
277

Article I, Section 8 begins with the phrase “The Congress shall have power to” and
enumerates the various congressional powers, delimiting each with semi-colon. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (“To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;”);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;”). Each clause after the first clause in
Section 8 are dependent on the phrase, “Congress shall have the power to,” indicating
that each subsequent clause is part of a grouping of congressional powers. This
“grouping” implies some special relationship between the various Article I Section 8
powers, making it more likely that they are meant to qualify one another in certain
circumstances or to operate co-extensively.
278
See supra Section I, (a)(i).
279
See Supra Section I, (a)(ii).
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constitutional power being subordinated would produce more
sound results. This balancing test should consider how vital the
doctrine being circumvented is to the constitutional provision in
which it originates from and weigh the purpose it serves against
the burden it will place on the horizontal constitutional power.
In the case of the constitutional idea-expression doctrine, the
court will have to weigh the underlying purpose of the doctrine, to
facilitate subject-matter independent regulation in copyright and
subject-matter regulation in patents, against the purposes of
passing copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause.
The test would operate as a horizontal preemption test. If the
circumvention of the horizontal provision would pose an
intolerable burden on the exercise of the constitutional grant of
power, then the burdening provision must be subordinated.
Reciprocally, if the broader grant of power would pose an obstacle
to the execution of the other constitutional provision then the
broader provision must be subordinated.
The test would require that a horizontal provision be allowed to
constrain its sister clause as long as doing so does not pose an
undue burden to the exercise of the first provision. The Commerce
Clause could be subordinated to the Intellectual Property Clause if
the doctrine that would qualify the Commerce Clause is necessary
to the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause. For example,
the circumvention of the originality requirement in copyright, a
constitutional doctrine, would not be readily tolerated, while the
circumvention of fixation may not compel the subordination of the
commerce clause. The test requires courts to engage in a case-bycase analysis.
C. The Test
The Horizontal Subordination test requires the consideration of
three elements. First the court must determine whether qualifying
the broader second provision will frustrate the goals of the first.
Second, the court must determine if the qualifying provision would
pose an undue burden to the exercise of constitutional power under
the provision being qualified. Third, the court must balance the
importance of the interests furthered by the dominance of each
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clause to determine which would be least restrictive to the overall
scheme of constitutional distributions of power.
The test would allow the constitutional idea-expression
doctrine to operate on statutes passed under alternate grants of
congressional power, but would not be allowed to interfere with
Congress’ vital power to regulate interstate commerce. The
Horizontal Subordination Canon coupled with a constitutional
idea-expression dichotomy will ensure that important divisions
between patent and copyright laws remain intact, and that the
boundaries of the property right conferred by the federal scheme of
intellectual property protection is more clearly defined, regardless
of which congressional power is used to effectuate it.
1. Applying the Horizontal Subordination Test to a
Constitutional Idea-Expression Doctrine
This section will begin with the assumption that the ideaexpression doctrine is a constitutional requirement, textually
derived from Article I Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.
With this assumption, this section will apply the three-part
horizontal subordination test to the conflict between the Commerce
Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause. This section will
specifically address whether the commerce clause can be used to
circumvent the requirements of a constitutional idea-expression
doctrine.
a) Will use of the commerce clause frustrate the goals of
the Intellectual Property Clause, particularly the
policies underlying the idea-expression doctrine?
As noted earlier, the Intellectual property clause has the
primary purpose of ensuring an economic benefit to inventors and
authors, for a limited time, in exchange for the public use of the
ideas after the term has expired. Specifically, the idea-expression
doctrine ensures that the property right that is conferred by the
clause is adequately defined, and that the distinction between
patents and copyrights remains a visible one. The idea-expression
doctrine is not only directly applied, but also supports other
corollary doctrines, some being constitutional and others not. In
particular, the Fair Use defense, which has significant First
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Amendment dimensions, would be significantly weaker without
the Idea-Expression doctrine. Fixation, a quasi-constitutional
requirement, which requires an idea to manifest itself as
expression, would also be significantly weaker without a broader
policy-division between idea and expression.
Commerce Clause legislation that lacks this requirement could
be used to vest copyright-like protection without such a division, in
turn making it difficult to ensure that the public derives the long
term benefits of conferring economic incentives on authors and
inventors for a limited time. This long-term benefit is the
cornerstone of the Intellectual Property clauses’ charge. Authors
and inventors are granted limited property rights so that the public
domain can benefit from new matter.
Granted, there is always tension when the requirements of one
clause are being circumvented; the question is a bit leading.280 It is,
however, clear that the economic incentive that the clause grants is
not for its own sake. It must yield benefits that inure to the benefit
of the public.281 The extent that commerce legislation undermines
the policy objectives of the intellectual property clause depends on
what benefits the public will enjoy under the unfettered legislation.
This aspect of the test is a fact specific inquiry. The principle
factor is whether the commerce legislation maintains some public
benefit in return for the economic incentive it confers on authors
and inventors for their ideas and expression.282
280

To presuppose that one provision is being “circumvented” by the other is to assume
one is being subordinated to the other. The presupposition ensures a particular answer.
281
It would be improper for the government to confer personal benefits on clever
inventors. It is assumed that if the sovereign’s treasury is being used that the public
derive some benefit. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 338 (“[A]n acceptable rational
basis can be neither purely personal nor purely partisan.”). Otherwise, it would be an
arbitrary use of government power, particularly in a democratic context. This notion is
rooted in the Rational Basis standard of review. At a minimum, government action must
be reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor concurring) (“Under our rational basis standard of
review, legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Government action that does not inure to the benefit of the
public cannot be legitimate. It is tenant of democratic government that the government
must work for its polity.
282
This is not unlike the Court’s requirement that federal funds provided to states on the
condition that the states implement federal standards must serve the general welfare. See
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b) Would imposing horizontal restraints on the Commerce
Power pose an undue burden on Congress’ power to
regulate commerce?
This factor inquires whether the imposition of the horizontal
constraint would makethe regulation of interstate commerce
impracticable. Congress is given broad powers to legislate
interstate commerce. When that power is qualified by a narrower
horizontal provision, there is a risk that the broader power will
become inert when it addresses or even touches on subject mater
mostly regulated by the Intellectual Property Clause. The extent
that the idea-expression doctrine would impact Congress’ ability to
regulate interstate commerce would depend on whether the ideaexpression doctrine would have a direct effect on the case at hand
or whether the doctrine would apply through one of its corollaries.
For example, granting a monopoly on a short phrase that copyright
law would not confer a property right on would be a more direct
application of the idea-expression doctrine than protecting
something that would typically be deemed a fair use under the
copyright laws.
The directness of the doctrine matters because the more
directly it applies, the more of the commerce power it
circumscribes. If commerce legislation directly protects ideas, and
the idea-expression doctrine applies to the Commerce Power, then
the horizontal provision would preclude regulation completely.
The more direct the application the more vital the qualifying
doctrine must be to the delicate balance that the Intellectual
Property Clause is meant to implement.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (“The first of these limitations is derived from
the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in
pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”). When certain congressional power is at issue, the
central purpose is to benefit the public, in turn that benefit is implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitutional provision. The Intellectual Property Clause is no different. It is implicit
that the reward for works of authorship and inventions are in exchange for the growth of
the public domain.
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c) What outcome would have the least restrictive effect on
the federal distribution of powers as they currently
exist?
This factor is a balancing test with special emphasis on
maintaining the status quo. This factor will examine the effect of
each clause being subordinated to the other and determine which
would disturb the status quo the least. Specifically, in the
Constitutional idea-expression and Commerce Clause context,
would subordinating the Intellectual Property Clause to the
Commerce Clause undermine the purpose of the Intellectual
Property Clause? Would the subordinating the broad Commerce
Clause to the narrower Intellectual Property Clause restrict
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce?
There are two reasons to side with the interpretation that is
least restrictive of the subordinated clause. First, constitutional
interpretation must be mindful of settled expectations, perhaps one
of the most important components of stare decisis.283 Second, it is
difficult to ascertain the effect of any interpretation with much
precision.284 Beginning with the least imposing interpretation will
allow a court to reverse itself should the decision prove to be suboptimal or undesirable.285

283

The court often related the notion of settled expectations to the doctrine of stare
decisis. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 548 (U.S. 1991)
(“By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may
dodge the stare decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that
otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents.”). The doctrine becomes a
stronger force the longer a rule has been in place in order to protect any reliance interest
that may have formed in the interim. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 32 (2005)
(“Considerations of stare decisis are particularly forceful in the area of statutory
construction, especially when a unanimous interpretation of a statute has been accepted
as settled law for several decades.”).
284
This principle is self-evident from the existence of circuit splits. Often times, lower
courts will not know for certain what the Supreme Court meant in a particular opinion
and are forced to rule in the absence of clarification, giving rise to divergent
interpretations of the same precedent.
285
Broader rules tend to give rise to stronger stare decisis effect. For example,
overturning the central holding a decision articulating a bright-line rule would unsettle
expectations to greater extent than overruling a more abstract ruling. To be sure,
overruling the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would have a
greater effect on settled expectations because it is more theoretically ambitious. A
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At the margins, the tradeoff may be indeterminate. This is
where the balancing test becomes the most critical. A court must
balance the competing purposes of the two constitutional
provisions and their doctrines to determine which must take
precedence. Although the three-factor approach is not a highly
determinate analytical rule, it does provide a useful framework for
analysis. The starting point for analysis is often determining the
purpose of the constitutional provision being interpreted. This is a
task that does not lend itself to rigid rules, which is why the test
must remain a balancing test, to maintain the necessary play in the
joints necessary for constitutional interpretation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The idea expression dichotomy operates to define the line
between public domain and private monopoly. The doctrine
facilitates the implicit bargain in intellectual property rights for
limited times, in that works are given short-term protections for the
permanent benefit to the public of the ideas underlying the work.
The doctrine is so fundamental to the scheme of protecting
intellectual property rights that circumventing it through the
exercise of an alternate constitutional power would undermine the
Constitution’s very charge to promote the progress of the useful
arts and sciences.
If interpreted to stem from the distinction between the useful
arts and sciences, the doctrine of idea-expression gains
constitutional stature and can apply horizontally to constrain
alternate exercises of power. The extent to which horizontal
constitutional power can constrain one another remains a difficult
determination. Rather than apply a rigid canon of construction,
such as requiring a narrower constitutional provision to qualify the
broader one, or allowing the broadest statute in the Constitution to
be the ultimate ceiling on federal power, a test that balances the
purpose of the qualifying provision against the burden placed on
the qualified provision to determine which constitutional provision

minimalist opinion will necessarily unsettle expectations to a lesser degree simply
because less has been decided.
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must yield, will produce more sound result. This Horizontal
Subordination test can facilitate the careful application of the
constitutional idea-expression doctrine to sister clauses and can
even be adapted to apply vertically to Article II powers, such as the
Treaty Power.
The tension between protecting intellectual property rights
subject to carefully circumscribed limits and regulating works that
travel through interstate commerce with fewer restrictions can be
resolved by attempting to resolve the constitutional conflict by
balancing each provision’s underlying purpose. The constitutional
mandate that congress promote the useful arts and sciences
depends heavily on a delicate bargain being struck between author
and the government providing the property incentive. This bargain
requires a delicate balance of monopoly and public benefit.
Circumventing the doctrines that have facilitated this delicate
balance would permanently damage the incentive scheme set in
place by the Constitution.

